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ABSTRACT 
 
We estimate the growth and utility effects of switching from a graduated-rate 
federal income tax to a flat tax along the lines of Hall-Rabushka (1995). We, furthermore, 
calculate the post-reform transition dynamics for a number of variables, including the 
economic growth rate, the representative household’s utility – using consumption 
equivalents as suggested by Lucas (2003) – , the allocation of time to education and 
market work, as well as the interest and wage rates. To achieve these goals, we rely on a 
dynamic equilibrium model proposed by Cassou and Lansing (2003), and calibrated to fit 
historical data about the U.S. economy and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax return 
statistics for the 2005 tax year. In the process, we specify a step-by-step calibration 
procedure for the model – a non-trivial undertaking left largely unexplained in Cassou 
and Lansing (2003).  
We find that the flat tax reform increases long-term economic growth, and that the 
magnitude of this effect depends on the U.S. economy’s intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in labor supply (IES). For values of IES that range from 0.25 to 1, the 
introduction of a Hall-Rabushka flat tax increases the long-term economic growth rate by 
0.003 - 0.255 percentage points. Although the flat tax reform has clear benefits in the 
long run, we find that it decreases economic growth during the first post-reform year, and 
lowers utility for several years after its implementation. Politicians concerned about their 
re-election prospects may, as a result, be inclined to carefully consider the political 
consequences of the flat tax reform in the timing of its adoption.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 1981, Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka, economists at the Hoover 
Institution at Stanford University, first proposed the idea of a flat tax in a Wall Street 
Journal article entitled “The Attractions of a Flat-Rate Tax System.” Having sparked 
debate about simplifying the federal income tax and introducing a single marginal rate, 
Hall and Rabushka published, in December 1981, another Wall Street Journal essay, “A 
Proposal to Simplify Our Tax System,” in which they elaborated on the details of their 
suggestion (Rabushka, 2002). In 1983, they expanded the essay into a book, Low Tax, 
Simple Tax, Flat Tax, followed by the best-selling The Flat Tax in 1985 and its second 
edition in 1995. 
Hall and Rabushka (1985) wrote that their flat tax proposal “[met] the tests of 
efficiency, equity and simplicity better than the other politically popular plans.” They 
believed that the flat tax would improve the performance of the U.S. economy. Increased 
take-home wages, they argued, would stimulate work effort, and raise total output. 
Rational investment incentives, furthermore, would spur additional investment and 
channel it into its most productive uses. 
The flat tax has attracted some attention in American politics, especially during 
the early 1990s. Former California governor Gerald Brown, for instance, endorsed the 
idea during his 1992 run in the Democratic primaries for the U.S. presidency.
1
 Most 
notably, Steve Forbes, a businessman and a Republican presidential candidate, made it 
the centerpiece of his 1996 campaign. Despite the enthusiasm that it created in some parts 
                                                 
1
 See Hall and Rabushka (1995), pp. 49. 
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of the political spectrum, the flat tax – whether in the Hall-Rabushka or any other form – 
has not been adopted in the United States.  
The flat income tax has, however, been implemented in a number of Central and 
Eastern European countries. In 1995, Estonia introduced it, and was followed by several 
other countries that had formerly been part of the Soviet Union - most notably Russia, 
which instituted a single marginal rate of 13 percent in 2001. In 2004, Slovakia 
introduced a 19-percent flat-rate income tax, and, in 2005, Romania switched to a 16-
percent flat tax on personal income and corporate profits (Moore, 2005; Grecu, 2004). 
Although these reforms differed, to some extent, from the Hall-Rabushka proposal, they 
all retained its central feature: Income was taxed at a single marginal tax rate. 
In this paper, we consider the effects of replacing the current graduated-rate 
federal income tax with a Hall-Rabushka flat tax, as specified in Hall and Rabushka 
(1995). We, furthermore, calculate the post-reform transition dynamics for variables such 
as the economic growth rate, the representative household’s utility expressed in 
consumption-equivalent variations following Lucas (2003), the allocation of time to 
education and market work, or the interest and wage rates. In doing so, we rely on a 
dynamic equilibrium model proposed by Cassou and Lansing (2003), calibrated to fit 
historical data about the U.S. economy and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax return 
statistics for the 2005 tax year. Finally, we comment on the political implications of our 
findings, and suggest potential avenues for further research.  
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II.  THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
 
A.  Individual Income Tax 
 The federal government levies a tax on the taxable income of individuals. The rate 
structure of the federal income tax is graduated with a number of brackets, in which 
income is subject to increasing marginal tax rates. During the 2006 fiscal year, marginal 
tax rates ranged from 10 to 35 percent. 
 The calculation of tax liability is a multi-step process, summarized in Box II.1.
2
 
One first has to compute his gross income by adding up labor income (wages and 
salaries), capital income (interest, rents and dividends), and other business income. To 
obtain the adjusted gross income (AGI), the taxpayer subtracts certain business 
expenses incurred in earning his income. Some forms of income are excluded from the 
AGI: These include state and local bond interest, unrealized capital gains, employers’ 
contributions to retirement funds and health insurance plans, saving into tax-preferred 
individual accounts,
3
 alimonies paid to a former spouse and, since 2003, some dividends 
which are now taxed using the capital gains rate schedule. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
2
 For detailed instructions on filling out federal income tax returns, see IRS, Pub. 17. 
3
 These tax-favored savings options include individual retirement accounts (IRAs), 401(k) plans, Self-
Employed Retirement plans and Education Savings Accounts (Rosen, 2005). 
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   BOX II.1 – COMPUTATION OF  THE FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX  
 
Income from taxable sources 
 Includes wages, interest, rents, profits, 
dividends, realized capital gains, etc. 
= Gross income 
- Certain business expenses 
= Adjusted gross income (AGI) 
- Personal exemptions 
- Deductions 
 either itemized: charitable contributions, 
some medical expenses, property and 
state income taxes, some interest 
payments, etc. 
 or standard deduction 
= Taxable income (tax base) 
► Apply income tax rate schedule 
- Tax credits 
= Tax liability (total tax payment) 
- Withholding 
= Final payment (or refund) due 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Rosen (2005) and Gruber (2005). 
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One’s taxable income, also called the tax base, is then computed by subtracting 
exemptions and deductions from the AGI.   
A family is allowed an exemption, adjusted annually for inflation, for each 
member. Above certain levels of AGI, however, the personal exemption is phased out, 
although, since 2006, the phase-out is being gradually eliminated (IRS, Pub. 553). 
The taxpayer can then take deductions from his taxable income. He can either 
choose to subtract a fixed amount, called the standard deduction, or to itemize and deduct 
for selected expenditures, specified by the tax code. If he opts for the latter, the taxpayer 
can claim deductions for unreimbursed medical and dental expenses exceeding 7.5 
percent of AGI, other taxes paid (state or local income taxes, as well as property and real 
estate taxes), mortgage interest payments, charitable contributions and some 
unreimbursed employee expenses, such as union dues or job travel costs (Gruber, 2005; 
Rosen, 2005). 
Having obtained his taxable income, the taxpayer can calculate his tax liability 
by first using the tax rate schedule, and then by applying tax credits, flat amounts 
subtracted from taxes owed. Most individuals’ taxes are withheld directly from their 
labor income when it is earned (IRS, Pub. 505). A taxpayer’s final payment will therefore 
depend on how much tax has already been withheld. If the government has withheld 
more in taxes than is due, the taxpayer will receive a refund. 
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B.  Alternative Minimum Tax 
 The alternative minimum tax (AMT) was enacted in 1969 in response to an 
uproar about some high-income households’ ability to avoid paying income taxes, and 
further strengthened in 1986 (Gruber, 2005). The tax code’s preferential treatment of 
some types of income, along with its many exemptions, deductions and credits, may 
allow some high-income individuals to greatly reduce their tax burden. The AMT intends 
to ensure that individuals who benefit from a variety of tax advantages pay some 
minimum amount of tax on their incomes. 
In order to calculate the AMT tax base, the taxpayer first needs to add AMT 
preferences – items such as personal exemptions, the standard deduction, state and local 
tax benefits, and others - to her taxable income. After subtracting the AMT exemption, 
which does not depend on the number of dependents and is phased out for high-income 
filers, she will obtain her alternative minimum tax income (AMTI). This income is 
then subject to a marginal tax rate of 26 percent on the first $175,000 and 28 percent 
above to calculate the taxpayer’s tentative AMT. If the tentative AMT exceeds tax 
liability under the individual income tax, the taxpayer must pay the difference (the 
alternative minimum tax) in addition to her regular income tax (Rosen, 2005). 
Unlike the ordinary individual income tax, the AMT brackets are not adjusted for 
inflation. Consequently, as nominal incomes rise, ever more taxpayers are becoming 
subject to the alternative minimum tax.       
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C.  Corporation Tax 
 The corporation tax is levied on the taxable income of corporations.
4
 Although it 
has a graduated schedule of marginal rates (IRS, Pub. 542), most corporate income is 
taxed at 35 percent. Interest payments to lenders, which are considered to be part of 
business costs, are excluded from taxable income, but dividends paid out to the 
shareholders are not. As a result, the corporation tax may discourage firms from raising 
funds by issuing equity, and instead bias them towards debt financing (Rosen, 2005). 
 More importantly for the purposes of our analysis, taxing dividends both at the 
corporate and, after the shareholders receive them, at the individual level, creates a 
problem of double taxation. Until the changes to the tax code introduced by the Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, dividends paid out to the shareholders 
were taxed at the individual’s marginal income tax rate. Today, dividends are subject to 
the capital gains rate schedule on the individual level, and hence the highest rate that can 
be applied to them is 15 percent. 
 
                                                 
4
 Corporations on whose taxable incomes the corporation tax is levied are denoted by the tax code as “C 
corporations.” Some small corporations with no more than a hundred shareholders (“S-corporations”) are 
not subject to the corporation tax. 
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III.  THE HALL-RABUSHKA FLAT TAX 
 
A.  Description 
Hall and Rabushka (1995) propose an integrated flat tax which would apply a 
single marginal rate τ to both businesses and individuals. 5  Correspondingly, their 
proposal consists of two components: the individual wage tax and the business tax. 
 
i) Individual wage tax 
The individual wage tax is levied on the income that employees receive as cash. 
Its base consists of realized payments of wages, salaries and pensions during a given 
period above a personal or family exemption. There are no deductions for mortgage 
interest or charitable gifts. Pension contributions are not taxed, and pension income is 
therefore taxed only once – when the worker receives the payment, but not when his 
employer sets aside the money. Unless the taxpayer owns a business, the individual wage 
tax is the only relevant component of the flat tax: there are no separate capital gains, 
dividend or interest taxes. 
To calculate his tax liability, the taxpayer first needs to add up all his cash income 
– wages, salaries, pensions and retirement benefits. After subtracting the fixed personal 
or family exception, the individual will arrive at the tax base for the individual wage tax. 
Finally, the single marginal tax rate τ is applied and, after accounting for taxes already 
withheld, the taxpayer obtains the final amount he owes.  Box III.1 outlines these 
computations. 
                                                 
5
 In their book, Hall and Rabushka (1995) propose a single tax rate of τ = 19%. In our description, however, 
we consider a more general case, in which we do not specify a particular rate. 
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        BOX III.1 – COMPUTATION OF  THE INDIVIDUAL WAGE TAX  
 
Wages and salary 
+ Pensions and retirement benefits 
- Personal or family exemption 
= Tax base for the individual wage tax 
►Multiply by single tax rate τ 
= Tax liability 
- Withholding 
= Final payment (or refund) due 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Hall and Rabushka (1995). 
 
 
 
ii) Business tax 
The business tax is levied on all types of income, except wages, salaries and 
pensions.  It aims to include all income apart from that taxed by the individual wage tax. 
Since there are no deductions for interest payments or dividends, any income received 
from business activity has already been taxed, and is therefore not subject to tax on the 
individual level. 
To encourage capital formation, Hall and Rabushka (1995) propose eliminating 
depreciation deductions, and replacing them by a complete first-year tax write-off of all 
investment spending. In other words, all investment is expensed.
6
 
                                                 
6
 Judd (1998, 1999) argues, however, that the Hall-Rabushka flat tax proposal is biased against investment 
in human capital, since individuals cannot deduct their educational spending. Section C of this chapter 
briefly discusses this criticism. 
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The tax base for the business tax, then, is the firm’s total annual revenue less any 
payments the company has made to its employees and suppliers. To calculate how much 
the taxpayer owes, she must then multiply the tax base by the single marginal rate τ and 
account for withholding.  Box III.2 summarizes this process. 
 
BOX III.2 – COMPUTATION OF  THE BUSINESS TAX  
 
Revenue from sale of goods and  services 
- Purchases of inputs 
- Payments to employees (wages and pensions) 
- Investment in capital equipment 
= Tax base for the business tax 
►Multiply by single tax rate τ 
= Tax liability 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Hall and Rabushka (1995). 
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B.  Progressiveness 
Because it retains personal or family exemptions, the Hall-Rabushka flat tax is 
progressive in the sense that higher-income taxpayers face higher average tax rates.
7
 
Individuals whose incomes fall below the level of the exemption do not pay any 
individual wage taxes. 
Consider, for instance, a flat tax regime with a single marginal tax rate τ, and no 
deductions. Table III.1 shows the average tax rate faced by individuals whose annual 
income ranges from 5,000 to 100,000 dollars, as the personal exemption rises from 0 to 
20,000 dollars.
8
 The progressive nature of the flat tax becomes clear as we examine the 
rows of the table: For any non-zero exemption, high-income individuals face a higher 
average tax rate.  
 
TABLE III.1 – FLAT TAX: AVERAGE TAX RATES UNDER THE INDIVIDUAL WAGE TAX WITH SINGLE MARGINAL TAX RATE τ 
 Individual’s Annual Income ($) 
Exemption ($) 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 50,000 100,000 
0 τ τ τ τ τ τ 
5,000 - 0.5 τ 0.667 τ 0.75 τ 0.9 τ 0.95 τ 
10,000 - - 0.333 τ 0.5 τ 0.8 τ 0.9 τ 
15,000 - - - 0.25 τ 0.7 τ  0.85 τ 
20,000 - - - - 0.6 τ 0.8 τ 
 
Note: A blank field indicates that the individual owes no taxes, and his average tax rate therefore equals zero. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
  
                                                 
7
 The marginal tax rate represents the effective tax rate applied on the last (incremental) dollar of income. 
The average tax rate, on the other hand, is obtained by dividing the total tax liability by an individual’s 
income. 
8
 We assume that these individuals are not business owners, and therefore are only affected by the 
individual wage tax. 
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C.  Relationship to Consumption Taxes 
Hall and Rabushka (1995) claim that the flat tax they propose is essentially a 
consumption tax. By expensing all capital investment at the business level, they argue, 
the flat tax removes investment spending from the tax base, leaving only consumption. 
Accordingly, the Hall-Rabushka flat tax is commonly cited as an example of a 
consumption tax in economic and public policy literature – see, for instance, Ventura 
(1999), McNulty (2000), or Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2001). 
A consumption tax would eliminate the bias of the current tax system against 
investment and saving in any form.  Judd (1998, 1999) argues, however, that the Hall-
Rabushka flat tax is not a true consumption tax: Their proposal is biased against 
investment in intangible human capital, as individuals cannot expense or deduct any 
educational spending, despite Boskin’s (1977) early counsel.  
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IV.  ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
 Economic growth is the long-term increase in aggregate per capita output 
produced by an economy, typically measured in terms of the per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP). This chapter provides a historical overview of economic growth in the 
United States, and describes two important models that attempt to explain how 
economies grow: the Solow growth model and the endogenous growth model. These two 
well-known models provide us with some insight as to the role of technological progress, 
as well as of physical and human capital accumulation in economic growth. These 
important themes also feature in the more complex, dynamic equilibrium model by 
Cassou and Lansing (2003), which is the workhorse of this paper’s analysis.9 
 In the long run, sustained economic growth is the most important factor in 
improving a country’s living standards. Because of compounding effects, minor 
differences in annual growth rates can eventually translate into vast differences in total 
output and, by extension, in the standard of living. Understanding what government 
policies have even small positive effects on long-term growth rates can thus go much 
further in improving living standards than any progress in the macroeconomics of 
business cycles and countercyclical policy (Barro and Xala-i-Martin, 2004). 
It is no wonder then that, as he was contemplating the virtues of high economic 
growth, the well-known macroeconomist Robert Lucas once famously remarked: “The 
consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering: 
Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else.” (Lucas, 1988) 
                                                 
9
 Chapter V gives a detailed description of the Cassou-Lansing model. 
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 Figure IV.1 depicts how the level of aggregate output changes depending on the 
annual growth rate. If the annual growth rate equals 3%, total output will increase almost 
twenty-fold in 100 years. With an annual growth rate of 2%, however, the increase will 
only be sevenfold, and with a 1% growth rate, output will less than triple in a hundred 
years.
10
 
 
FIGURE IV.1 – AGGREGATE OUTPUT DEVELOPMENT WITH VARYING GROWTH RATES 
 
Note: Initially, total output is assumed to be equal to 1 unit. Aggregate output  
increases at an annual growth rate of 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5 or 3 percent.  
 
 
For any individual country, economic growth rates typically do not remain 
constant over time (Jones, 2002). Figure IV.2 plots the real per capita GDP in the United 
States during the 1870-2003 time period, compiled by Maddison (2007) and expressed in 
                                                 
10
 The “rule of 72” can be used to estimate how much time output will take to double at a given growth rate. 
When the economic growth rate is 3 percent, for example, aggregate output will double in approximately 
72/3=24 years.  
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1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars.
11
  Between 1901 and 2000, real per capita GDP 
rose from 4,464 to 28,403 Geary-Khamis dollars, representing more than a six-fold 
increase.  
 
FIGURE IV.2 – PER CAPITA GDP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870-2003 
  
Source: Maddison (2007). 
 
 
Figure IV.3 shows annual economic growth rates calculated over the same period. 
We see that, in the course of the 20
th
 century, the U.S. economy saw distinctly negative 
growth rates during the Great Depression in the 1930s, followed by a pronounced surge 
in GDP growth during the Second World War. For the rest of the century, periods of 
                                                 
11
 The Geary-Khamis dollar, first suggested by Geary (1958) and later developed by UN statistician Salem 
Khamis, combines the concepts of category international prices and purchasing power parity into an 
aggregation method whose properties make it useful in international economic comparisons (UNSD, 1992). 
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economic growth were interrupted by occasional recessions. Business cycles, however, 
became milder and less frequent after the Second World War (Temin, 1998).  
 
FIGURE IV.3 – ANNUAL ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870-2003 
 
Source: Maddison (2007) and author’s calculations. 
 
In advanced countries, long-term economic growth rates tend to be stable, 
provided one averages over time periods that are long enough to eliminate business cycle 
effects (Lucas, 1988). Despite the short-term fluctuations in growth rates, the average 
long-term trend in per capita output in the United States has been positive and relatively 
constant during the 20
th
 century.  Figure IV.4 displays the 1870-2003 per capita GDP in 
the United States using a logarithmic scale, along with a linear trend line. When a 
logarithmic scale is used, the slope of the per capita GDP curve at a given point in time 
represents the corresponding continuous economic growth rate.  
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FIGURE IV.4 – PER CAPITA GDP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870-2003 
 
Source: Maddison (2007) and author’s calculations. 
 
The slope of the trend line represents the average long-term growth rate of per 
capita output in the U.S. economy between 1870 and 2003. A simple, log-linear ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression of GDP per capita against the corresponding year
12
 yields 
a slope coefficient of 0.018635, indicating that the long-term growth rate was about 1.86 
percent. 
                                                 
12
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A.  Solow Growth Model 
 
The Solow growth model, also known as the neoclassical or the exogenous 
growth model, was developed by Robert Solow (1957). It suggests that only improving 
productivity can sustain economic growth in the long run. With constant growth in total 
factor productivity, the economy eventually reaches a balanced growth path where output, 
capital, and consumption per capita all grow at the same rate. The model, however, leaves 
the source of productivity growth unexplained:  Technological progress, in other words, 
is exogenous. In this section, we examine a variation on the Solow model similar to that 
described in Williamson (2004) and Williams (2007). 
First, we assume that the labor force N grows at a constant rate ng : 
t
tt
n
N
NN
g

 1  
The economy has a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function: 
   1,0,, 1    ttttttt NKzNKFzY , 
where tY  is total output, tz  represents the state of technology, tK  is the capital stock, and 
tN  stands for the labor force at time t. The exponents  and  1  are constants that 
represent the capital and labor shares in the economy,
 13
 respectively, and can be 
interpreted as output elasticities with respect to labor or capital.
14
 
                                                 
13
 If the labor and credit markets are perfectly competitive, the prices of inputs must, in equilibrium, be 
equal to their marginal products. After imposing this condition, differentiating the aggregate production 
function and rearranging, we obtain: 
t
tt
t
tt
Y
Nw
Y
Kr
  1;  
14
 Output elasticities represent the proportional responsiveness of output to incremental changes in the 
capital stock or labor force: 
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First tested against empirical evidence by Cobb and Douglas (1928), this 
functional form has become standard in macroeconomic research, because of its realistic 
properties
15
 and success at describing the relation between output, capital and labor in the 
United States (Blanchard, 2003).   
In the Solow model, a closed economy produces a single representative good 
without any government intervention. All factors of production are fully employed.
16
 For 
simplicity, we now assume that technology does not improve over time: total factor 
productivity (TFP), denoted by tz , remains constant at 1. Later, we shall consider an 
economy with technological progress. 
Let us now define the following per worker variables: 
t
t
t
t
t
t
N
K
k
N
Y
y  ;  
After plugging the Cobb-Douglas specification for tY  into the per worker output 
equation, we obtain: 




t
t
t
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y 

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

 
1
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 The Cobb-Douglas production function has intuitively plausible properties. It exhibits constant returns to 
scale: A doubling of both inputs (labor and capital) will double the output. Each input is essential, since 
nothing can be produced in the absence of either labor or capital. The law of diminishing returns holds, as 
marginal productivities of both capital and labor are positive and decreasing: 
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The marginal productivity of each factor, furthermore, increases in the other. An additional unit of labor, 
for instance, yields more output, ceteris paribus, if it is combined with a higher capital stock: 
0
2
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16
 There is no unemployment, and no capital remains idle. Households derive utility only from consumption 
and do not value leisure, and therefore inelastically supply one unit of labor. 
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During any given period, the value of total output produced must be equal to the 
sum of wage and interest incomes received by all households in the economy: 
.ttttt NwKrY   Households save a constant fraction s of their incomes, and consume 
the rest:  
tttttt YsNwKrsC )1(][)1(   
In the credit market equilibrium, saving equals investment: 
tt IYs   
The law of motion for capital, where   stands for the depreciation rate: 
ttttt YsKIKK  )1()1(1   
tttt KYsKK 1  
Let us now consider the per capita accumulation of capital:  
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We have thus arrived at the fundamental equation of the Solow growth model: 
tnttt kgkskk )(1 
   
The economy eventually settles into a steady state, in which the per capita amount 
of capital as well as per capita output and consumption remain constant ( tt kkk  1
*
; 
01  tt kk ): 
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The corresponding values of steady-state per capita output and consumption are: 
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))(1( ** ksc   
In Figure IV.5, the steady-state per capita level of capital occurs where the 
 kg n   line, indicating the influence of demographic growth and the depreciation rate, 
and the sk  curve which represents the amount of per capita saving in the economy. 
 
FIGURE IV.5 – STEADY-STATE IN THE SOLOW GROWTH MODEL WITHOUT TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH 
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Having analyzed an economy without technological progress, we can now 
introduce productivity growth into the model. For simplicity, we characterize TFP growth 
as labor-augmenting, or Harrod-neutral, technological change: A unit of labor is more 
productive when the level of technology is higher (Jones, 2002). The aggregate 
production function becomes: 
  1,0,)( 1    tttt NAKY , 
which is equivalent to the original definition of 
  1tttt NKzY with
 1tt Az . 
Let us assume that the rate of technological growth is constant at Ag : 
t
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 1  
In this case, the economy will ultimately settle on a balanced growth path, where 
the output, capital and consumption per worker all grow at the same, constant rate Ag . To 
solve for this equilibrium, we will need to work with variables that remain constant over 
time: 
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We then repeat our earlier analysis with the above variables: 
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The per capita accumulation of the capital stock is described by the equation:  
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The fundamental equation of the Solow growth model with technological growth 
will thus be: 
  0~)(~ **  kggks nA 

 
By isolating *
~
k , we can solve for the balance growth path equilibrium: 
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A change in the capital stock, labor force growth rate or savings rate can affect the 
transition dynamics of the economy for some time, but in the long run, continued 
economic growth will only be driven by sustained technological progress. 
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 Figure IV.6 shows how the balanced growth path level of tk
~
 depends on the 
amount of saving in the economy, the technological and demographic growth rates, and 
the depreciation rate.  
 
FIGURE IV.6 – BALANCED GROWTH PATH IN THE SOLOW GROWTH MODEL WITH TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH 
 
The Cassou-Lansing model, described in Chapter V, also settles into a balanced 
growth path equilibrium in which aggregate output, and the stocks of physical and human 
capital grow at the same constant rate. Unlike the basic Solow model, however, it does 
not feature exogenous (and hence unexplained) technological growth, but rather relies on 
investment in human capital to improve labor productivity. In this respect, the Cassou-
Lansing model is similar to the endogenous growth model, whose basic characteristics 
are outlined in the next section. 
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B.  Endogenous Growth Model 
The Solow growth model does not explain the origins of technological progress. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, endogenous growth models that account for 
productivity growth were developed, most notably by Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas 
(1988). 
In developing the model,
17
 we abstract away from concerns about the labor force, 
and consider an aggregate production function where total output depends on the total 
factor productivity, and on the use of human and physical capital:
18
 
 1,0,1    tttt KHzY  
If we assume that human capital is a constant fraction j of physical capital 
 tt jKH   and let 
zjA  , we can reformulate the production function as follows: 
    ttttttt AKKzjKjKzKzHY    11  
Human capital includes the education, skills and training that workers possess, 
and which increase their productivity.
19
 In addition, we could interpret human capital as 
the stock of knowledge that results from continuing research and development, or as the 
degree to which physical capital is being put to better use as a result of learning-by-doing. 
Our production function indicates that, as the economy expands, the stock of 
human capital increases proportionally with the amount of physical capital. 
                                                 
17
 As in the section on the Solow growth model, lecture notes by Williams (2007) form the basis of our 
description. 
18
 This specification of the production function has, much like the one in the Solow growth model, the 
Cobb-Douglas form. In this endogenous growth model, however, we do not consider the input of labor, and 
instead focus on human capital. 
19
 Without the gradual accumulation of human capital, the law of diminishing returns would set in for 
physical capital. Investment in education, skills and training offsets this decrease in the marginal product of 
physical capital, as the marginal products of human and physical capital are both increasing in the other 
factor. 
Hlavac    26 
As in the exogenous model, households save a constant fraction s of the output 
and, in the credit market equilibrium, total savings equal investment. We obtain the 
following law of motion for physical capital: 
 tttt KIKK 1  
  ttttttt KsAKsAKKIKK  1  
 
We can now solve for the balanced growth path equilibrium, in which per worker 
output and physical capital grows at the same rate sA  : 
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tt
t
tt 11  
The long-run rate of economic growth therefore depends largely on the savings 
rate. Higher savings mean more investment in physical capital, which in turn translates 
into a higher stock of human capital (more education, research and development, or 
learning-by-doing). A higher savings rate thus yields greater productivity and higher 
growth.  
Neither the basic Solow growth model nor the endogenous growth model takes 
into account the government’s fiscal policy – its taxing and spending decisions. The 
Cassou-Lansing model, explained in the next chapter, incorporates the basic insights and 
approaches from these two models – their focus on the role of capital accumulation, for 
instance, in explaining economic growth – into a complex dynamic equilibrium 
framework along the lines of Kydland and Prescott (1982), while also accounting for the 
effects of changes in the tax code. 
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V.  THE CASSOU-LANSING MODEL 
 
Cassou and Lansing (2003) construct a dynamic equilibrium model to simulate 
the effects that changes in the tax code have on the long-term growth rate. The model 
economy consists of a representative household, the government, and a firm that 
encompasses the entire productive economy. Its parameters are calibrated to fit empirical 
facts about the U.S. economy. Functional forms are chosen to allow for a closed-form 
solution.  
 
A. Basic Framework 
The representative household maximizes the following utility function: 
    1,0,1,ln
0




t
ttt
t lhVc ,    ( 1 ) 
where t indexes time,   is the discount factor, tc  is private consumption, th  represents 
the household’s stock of human capital, and tl  stands for leisure as a proportion of the 
overall time endowment. Total time available is normalized to equal 1, and  tl1  thus 
represents the proportion of time spent in non-leisure activities – either at work or in 
education.  Function V quantifies the disutility associated with non-leisure time: 
0,0,)1()1,(   BlhBlhV tttt ,    ( 2 ) 
where th  adjusts for the quality of foregone leisure, along the lines of Heckman (1976) 
and Becker (1965). Heckman (1976) notes that human capital can be assumed to be a 
direct source of consumption benefits as it augments a household’s effective consumption 
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time. The exponent   suggests that the disutility from non-leisure increases 
exponentially as the household spends more time at work or in education. The 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply, furthermore, equals  
  11   .20 
 Time can be allocated to leisure, work or education. If the overall time 
endowment is 1 and the proportion of time spent in education is denoted by te , 
)1( tt el   represents the proportion of time spent working.
 21
 
 The representative household consumes part of its after-tax income ( tc ), and 
devotes the rest to investment into either human or physical capital ( hti  and kti , 
respectively). In any given period t, the household receives a rental rate tr  for each unit 
of physical capital used in production, and earns a wage tw  for each unit of effective 
labor, measured by )1( ttt elh  , it supplies. In maximizing its utility, the representative 
household must thus conform to the within-period budget constraint: 
ttttttthtktt Telhwkriic  )1(    ( 3 ) 
 
Taxes tT  paid to the government are given by the equation: 
       hthktkttbhthktkttbtttttptt iikriikrDelhwT   11 ,  ( 4 ) 
where pt  is the personal tax rate, b  is the business (corporate) tax rate. In every period, 
personal taxable income consists of labor income less the standard deduction tD  and the 
                                                 
20
 Since   01lim 1    , as   gets larger (i.e., labor supply  becomes less elastic across time), 
 tl1 approaches unity and the model reduces to one with a fixed allocation of time. 
21
 Compared to Cassou and Lansing (2003), we have changed some of the notation to make it more 
intuitive. In the original paper, for instance, lt denoted time spent in non-leisure activities, which is 
somewhat confusing. 
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after-tax business income, assumed to be paid out as dividends. The extent to which there 
is double taxation of business income is denoted by  1,0 . The parameters 
 1,0, hk   represent the fractions of physical and human capital, respectively, that can 
be expensed.
22
 
 The aggregate production function in the model economy has a Cobb-Douglas 
form and is given by: 
    1,0,0,1 1    zelhzky ttttt ,    ( 5 ) 
where per capita output ty  is an increasing function of the state of technology, of the 
stock of physical capital and of the amount of effective labor supplied. The constant   
represents the capital share in the economy, while  1  is the labor share. 
 In a perfectly competitive, profit-maximizing environment, factors of production 
earn their marginal products. The equilibrium rental rate tr  and wage tw  will therefore 
be: 
t
t
t
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    ( 6 ), ( 7 ) 
 The laws of motion for physical and human capital are as follows: 
 1,0,0,11 

 kkkttkt AikAk
kk      ( 8 ) 
  0,1,0,0,11 

 vAeihAh hh
v
thttht
hh  ,   ( 9 ) 
The nonlinear functional form reflects adjustment costs, as suggested in Lucas 
and Prescott (1971). Whereas physical capital only accumulates through investment kti , 
                                                 
22
 An expenditure that is expensed can be immediately deducted from business taxable income.  
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households can build up their human capital stocks either through direct investment hti , 
or by allocating some of their time to education ( te ). 
 
B. Taxes and Government Spending 
The personal tax rate is given by the equation: 
    
    
n
hthktkttbttttt
hthktkttbttttt
ppt
IIKrDELHw
iikrDelhw












11
11
,  ( 10 ) 
where capital letters denote averages across all households in the economy. An individual 
household’s decisions cannot affect the values of these economy-wide averages. 
Parameters  1,0p  and 0n represent the level and slope of the tax schedule, 
respectively, and are estimated by regression from empirical data.  
In a graduated tax-rate schedule, 0n  as households with an above-average 
taxable income pay higher tax rates than those whose income is below the average. With 
a flat tax, on the other hand, marginal tax rates are the same regardless of taxable income, 
and hence, 0n , and ppt   . 
The standard deduction tD , whose level is set by the government, is assumed to 
be a constant fraction   of the aggregate output tY : 
0,   tt YD     ( 11 ) 
Average tax rates are calculated by dividing the amount of tax revenue by taxable 
income. Marginal rates, on the other hand, can be thought of as the tax rates paid on the 
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last dollar of income earned, and are computed by differentiating tax revenue with respect 
to taxable income. 
To calculate the marginal personal tax rate, we first multiply equation (10) by 
personal taxable income      hthktkttbttttt iikrDelhw   11 : 
     
      nhthktkttbttttt
n
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
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
11
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Differentiating this expression with respect to personal taxable income yields: 
 
     
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Finally, we impose aggregate consistency conditions tt Hh  , tt Kk  , ktkt Ii  , 
htht Ii   , and    tttt ELel  11 . Hence, the marginal personal tax rate ( 12 ) is 
equal to  1np  . The average personal tax rate ( 13 ) simply equals p . 
The average business tax rate can be computed by dividing the total amount of tax 
collected on business income, whether through the corporate tax or by the double taxation 
of dividends in the personal income tax, by business taxable income  hthktktt iikr   : 
     
 
  pbb
hthktktt
hthktkttpbhthktkttb
iikr
iikriikr






1
1
    ( 14 ) 
Each additional dollar of business income is taxed at the statutory corporate tax 
rate b  and, with double taxation of business income, also at the marginal personal tax 
rate  1np . The marginal business tax rate ( 15 ) thus becomes    11  npbb  . 
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The government uses tax receipts to finance its spending tG . In their model, 
Cassou and Lansing (2003) assume that government expenditures are unproductive and 
do not provide any utility to the households.  
A period-by-period balanced budget is imposed ( 16 ) – during each time period, 
government expenditures must equal the sum of personal and business income taxes 
collected: 
       hthktkttbhthktkttbtttttptt IIKrIIKrDELHwG   11   
 
Over time, government spending is modeled to increase in fixed proportion with 
the aggregate income in the economy, and thus remains a significant portion of output: 
0,   tt YG      ( 17 ) 
 
C. Optimal Decision Rules 
In Appendix A, we show how Cassou and Lansing (2003) derive the following 
closed-form decision rules for the household’s choice of  tttthtkt eelcii ,1,,,   at any 
given time t: 
   
  tkkt yai  10 ,  
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( 18 ) 
  thht ybi  10 , 
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   ( 20 ) 
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
 ,   ( 22 ) 
where 0a , 0b , 1p  and 2p  are combinations of deep parameters, as specified in the 
appendix.  
 We see that private investment in physical and human capital depends on the 
effective marginal tax rates k  and h , which are derived by combining tax code 
parameters p , b ,   and n  with the expensing parameters k  and h .
23
 The labor and 
education decision rules imply that households spend less time in non-leisure activities, 
as they accumulate more human capital relative to their stock of physical capital. 
Intuitively, this happens because the opportunity cost of foregone leisure increases with 
the stock of human capital a household possesses, as suggested by Heckman (1976). 
 A close examination of the optimal decision rules reveals how investment in 
human and physical capital, and the amount of time spent in market work and education 
react to changes in the personal ( p ) and business ( b ) tax rate levels, and in the slope of 
the personal income tax rate schedule n . In examining these reactions, we assume that all 
other parameters are within ranges we would reasonably expect to see in real world 
economies. 
                                                 
23
 With a pure consumption tax, h  = k = 1, h  = k  = 0 
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The effective marginal tax rate on physical capital ( k ) is an increasing function 
of b  and, as long as there is at least some double taxation of dividends (  > 0), of p  
and n  as well. In the absence of double taxation of dividends (when   = 0), k  is 
unresponsive to changes in the personal tax rate or in the tax schedule slope. As a result, 
we can conclude that lowering the personal and business tax rates, or making the tax rate 
schedule flatter, in general, increases the level of investment in physical capital ( kti ), 
which is decreasing in k . In the special case of no double taxation of dividends, 
however, lowering the personal tax rate or changing the slope of the tax rate schedule has 
no effect on physical capital investment. 
The effective marginal tax rate on human capital ( h ) is also increasing in the 
personal tax level p  and in the tax rate schedule slope n , but decreases with higher 
business tax rates b . Unlike in the case of k , the direction of h ’s responsiveness to tax 
rate changes does not depend on the extent of the double taxation of dividends, or on 
changes in the slope of the tax rate schedule. Consequently, since hti  increases with 
lower values of h , we infer that the level of human capital investment rises with lower 
personal tax rates  p  , a flatter tax schedule n , and higher business tax rates b . This 
result makes intuitive sense, since taxing physical capital more heavily by increasing 
business tax rates may induce households to substitute more human capital investment. 
The proportion of time households spend engaged in market work )1( tt el   is 
a decreasing function of the personal tax rate p  and of the slope of the tax rate schedule 
n , as is the proportion of time spent in education ( te ). In other words, taxing personal 
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income at lower rates – a policy which can be achieved either by reducing the base level 
of personal tax rates, or by flattening the tax rate schedule - induces households to work 
more, and spend more time building up their human capital. The business tax rate b , 
however, has no effect on the way households allocate their time. 
After substituting the decision rule for the proportion of time spent at work (21) 
into the aggregate production function (5), we obtain an expression for the equilibrium 
output per capita: 
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Given an initial stock of human ( 0h ) and physical ( 0k ) capital, we can 
characterize the model economy’s dynamic transition path. To obtain the equilibrium 
laws of motion, we substitute investment decision rules (18), (19) and (22), as well as the 
equilibrium per capita output relation (23), into the basic laws of motion (8) and (9): 
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The specification of the Cassou-Lansing model implies that, in the balanced 
growth path, the values of ty , tc , tk , th , kti  and hti  all grow at the same constant rate 
 . Under these circumstances, the ratio R of the stock of human and physical capital will 
not change over time. To derive R ( 26 ), we divide (25) by (24), and impose the balanced 
growth path condition 
1
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The balanced growth path ratio R of the stock of human capital to that of physical 
capital increases as business income is taxed at a higher rate b , and as the tax rate 
schedule becomes flatter ( n  goes down). The effect of changes in p  
is theoretically 
ambiguous, and depends – in practice – on the current tax code parameters ( p , b  and 
n ), and the relative size of the elasticities k  and h . 
To calculate the growth rate   ( 27 ) on the balanced growth path, we take 
logarithms of equations (24) and (25) and plug in (26) for R: 
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The above expression implies – provided that all parameters have realistic values 
- that the economic growth rate on the balanced growth path increases as the personal tax 
rate schedule flattens (in other words, as n  decreases), and as p  
and b  decrease.
24
 A 
relatively flat tax rate schedule with low tax rates, then, will be more conducive to faster 
economic growth than one with high and steeply increasing marginal tax rates. 
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 A simple way to find out how changes in the tax code parameters affect the economic growth rate is to 
combine all the individual terms in equation (27) into a single logarithm, and then examine how the 
changing values of p , b  
and n  affect  . 
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D. Revenue Neutrality 
If we substitute equations (6), (7), (11), (18) and (19) into equation (16), and 
impose aggregate consistency conditions, we can rearrange equation (17) to obtain the 
following relationship among the various tax code parameters: 
         hhkkpbbp ba   1111 00  ( 28 ) 
 A tax reform can affect the growth rates of a number of variables, and the 
concept of revenue neutrality in the model must therefore be a relative one – specifically, 
the expected tax revenue at the time of reform must constitute the same fraction of output 
as the pre-reform tax receipts did. Since all government spending is paid for using tax 
revenues, to achieve revenue neutrality, the value of   in the government spending 
equation (17) will have to remain unchanged as the government changes the tax schedule 
parameters.  
To maintain revenue neutrality, therefore, we choose the flat tax rate bp    
to satisfy equation (28) at the pre-reform value of  . 
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E. Calibration of the Model: General Procedure 
To yield meaningful predictions, the Cassou-Lansing model must first be 
calibrated to fit empirical data about the U.S. economy up until the time of reform. In this 
appendix, we describe a systematic way, obtained by reverse-engineering Cassou and 
Lansing (2003), to calibrate the parameters of the model. 
To calibrate the model, we need estimates, based on the econometric analysis of 
empirical data or on the findings of previous studies, of the following variables on the 
pre-reform balanced growth path: 
)ˆˆ1( tt el   - the proportion of time a typical household spends working  
teˆ  - the average fraction of time households spend in education 
t
t
k
h
ˆ
ˆ
- the proportion of the stock of human capital to that of physical capital 
t
t
y
k
ˆ
ˆ
 - the average amount of physical capital as a proportion of total output 
t
kt
y
i
ˆ
ˆ
, 
t
ht
y
i
ˆ
ˆ
- the ratios of physical and human capital investment to output 
ˆ  - the average rate of long-run economic growth 
In addition to estimates of the above variables, in calibrating the model we make 
use of variables describing the fundamental features of the economy – such as the 
discount factor  , and the labor and capital shares ( 1  and  , respectively) – and of 
the pre-reform characteristics of the tax system: the level pˆ  and slope nˆ of the personal 
income tax schedule estimated through a regression analysis of government data, the 
statutory corporate tax rate bˆ , and the extent ˆ  of double taxation of business income.  
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 First, we rearrange the optimal decision rule for the proportion of time spent at 
work (21) to estimate 
1p : 
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We can now use the decision rule for time spent in education (22) to derive an 
estimate for 2p : 
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To find z , we rearrange the aggregate production function (23) in the following 
manner: 
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For simplicity, we assume that, at the time of reform, the per capita output equals 
one unit. After plugging in, the above expression thus becomes: 
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After rearranging, we obtain an expression that will allow us to calibrate z : 
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To estimate k , we plug in the expression for 0a , as defined in Appendix A,
25
 
into the decision rule for physical capital investment (18): 
   k
k
k
k
t
kt a
y
i



 

 110  
We then isolate k : 
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To calibrate v  and h , we need to solve two simultaneous equations, one based 
on the optimum decision rule for human capital investment (19) and the other on an 
expression for 2p  from Appendix A: 
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Let us rearrange the second equation to bring v  to the left-hand side, and plug the 
resulting expression into the human investment decision rule (19): 
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We now solve for h : 
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To obtain an estimate for v , we plug h  back into the expression: 
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To calibrate B , we now rearrange the expression for 1p , given in Appendix A: 
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Finally, we make use of the long-term growth equation (27) to calibrate 
kA  and 
hA , respectively: 
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Figure V.1 shows how the variables to be calibrated relate to one another. An 
arrow pointing from one variable to another signifies that one cannot calibrate the latter 
until the value of the former has been estimated. Figure V.2 describes the manner in 
which empirical facts about the U.S. economy, assumed to hold on the pre-reform 
balanced growth path, are used as inputs into the calibration process. 
 
FIGURE V.1 – RELATIONSHIPS AMONG VARIABLES TO BE CALIBRATED 
 
Note: Arrows denote how the estimated values of individual variables are used as inputs into the 
calibration of other variables. If a variables is not pointed at by any arrow, it is “exogenous” in 
the sense that it can be estimated directly from empirical facts about the U.S. economy, without 
using any of the other variables in the figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
z 
 
p1 
 
 
 p2 
 
v B Ah Ak 
 
δk 
 
δh 
Hlavac    44 
FIGURE V.2 – EMPIRICAL FACTS ABOUT THE  U.S. ECONOMY AS CALIBRATION INPUTS 
 
Note: The middle column denotes the variables that need to be calibrated. The constants  
in the left and right columns represent empirical facts about the U.S. economy, generally  
obtained from previous economic studies. The arrows indicate which empirical facts are  
used in the calibration of individual variables. 
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VI.  QUANTITATIVE CALIBRATION AND RESULTS 
 
A. Calibration  
I. Characteristics of the U.S. Economy 
a.) Discount Factor   
We calibrate the discount factor   to be 0.9615, which implies an annual real 
pre-tax interest rate of 4 percent.
26
 This estimate is similar to that used by Kydland and 
Prescott (1982) and by Greenwood, Rogerson and Wright (1993), who use a quarterly 
discount factor of 0.99, corresponding to a real interest rate of 1 percent per quarter and, 
hence, approximately 4 percent per year. Our calibrated value is somewhat lower than the 
0.979 estimate used by Lansing and Cassou (2003), designed to achieve an after-tax rate 
of 4 percent based on Poterba (1997), and Paez-Farrell’s (2005) estimate of 0.9801, 
which assumed a quarterly discount factor of 0.995. On the other hand, our value of   
exceeds the discount factor of 0.9433 used by Gomme, Kydland and Rupert (2001), who 
wanted to approximate a real annual interest rate of 6 percent in the steady state. In light 
of the sizeable variation in discount factor values in the economic literature, our 
conservative estimate of 0.9615 appears to be appropriate. 
b.) Long-Term Growth Rate ˆ  
During the time period from 1870 until 2003, the long-term growth rate of the U.S. 
economy ˆ  was about 0.0186, or 1.86 percent, as the regression analysis in Chapter IV 
has shown. 
                                                 
26
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c.) Labor  1  and Capital    Shares 
We estimate the average long-run share of labor income in the economy from the 
Economic Report of the President (CEA, 2007).
27
 For any given year t, the corresponding 
labor share  t1  is the proportion of national income that employees receive as their 
compensation.
28
 In a traditional Cobb-Douglas setting, similar to that employed by 
Cassou and Lansing (2003) where the only aggregate inputs are labor and capital, the 
capital share during the year t will simply equal  tt   11 . Figures VI.1 and VI.2 
show the annual labor and capital shares, respectively, for the time period from 1959 to 
2005. Consistent with the stylized facts about capital accumulation outlined by Kaldor 
(1961), the labor and capital shares in the U.S. economy have remained approximately 
constant over time.
29
 
In our analysis, we use the average long-run share of labor and capital income in 
the U.S. economy, computed by taking the arithmetic mean of annual income shares from 
1959 to 2005: 
 
 
  649.01
119592005
1
1
2005
1959


 
t
t  
 
351.0
119592005
1 2005
1959


 
t
t
                                                 
27
 See “Statistical Table B-28: National Income by Type of Income,” (CEA, 2007). 
28
 In the report, employee compensation consists of wages and wage accruals, complemented by employer 
contributions to pension funds, insurance funds and government social insurance.  
29
 In our sample, the minimum annual value of the labor share is 0.323, whereas the maximum is 0.389. 
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FIGURE VI.1 – LABOR SHARE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY, 1959-2005 
 
Source: Council of Economic Advisers (2007) and author’s calculations.  
 
 
 
FIGURE VI.2 – CAPITAL SHARE IN THE  U.S. ECONOMY, 1959-2005 
 
Source: Council of Economic Advisers (2007) and author’s calculations.  
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d.) Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution in Labor Supply   11    
A number of studies have tried to estimate the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution (IES) in labor supply, and their conclusions vary widely. Hall (1988) and 
Ball (1990) have found estimates close to zero. Similarly, MaCurdy (1981) found an IES 
between 0.1 and 0.3. Altonji’s (1986) estimates indicate a value between 0 and 0.35. For 
French (2004), a conservative range for the IES would run from -0.5 to 0.6. 
Some economists, however, argue that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
in labor supply may be significantly higher. Ham and Reilly (2006), for instance, 
consider an implicit contracts model, in which workers bargain over state-contingent 
contracts denominated in terms of consumption and hours of work, and find an IES of 
either 0.9 or 1.
30
 Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (2000) argue that IES estimates obtained 
from traditional life cycle models exhibit a large downward bias, as they neglect changes 
in work done at home over time. Beaudry and van Wincoop (1996) find that the IES is 
significantly different from zero, and probably close to 1.  
In light of the varied findings, we estimate the Cassou-Lansing model for three 
different IES values  = 0.25 (low), 0.5 (intermediate) and 1 (high). The corresponding 
values of   are 5, 3 and 2, respectively. 
  
                                                 
30
 Ham and Reilly’s (2006) analysis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) yields an estimate of 
0.9, whereas their examination of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) yields a value of 1. 
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e.) Proportion of Time Spent in Market Work )ˆˆ1( tt el   and Educational 
Activities )ˆ( te  
Since our representative household has three members – two employed adults, 
and one child who attends school
31
 – its daily time endowment is 3 x 24 = 72 hours.32 In 
calibrating our model, we normalize this time endowment to one. 
According to the American Time Use Survey (BLS, 2007), in 2006, employed 
Americans spent an average of 7.6 hours in market work every day. Consequently, in the 
representative household with two working adults, about 21.11 percent of time will be 
spent in market work.
33
  
The same survey indicates that, during 2006, about 9 percent of people in the 
United States engaged in educational activities. Those who attended school spent a daily 
average of 4.5 hours in class, the survey finds, and those who did homework or research 
spent about 2.4 hours on it every day. We assume that, in the representative household, 
the child’s studying habits conform to these findings, and estimate that education takes up 
9.583 percent of the household’s time.34 This estimate is probably conservative, as it does 
not include time spent in on-the-job training, or any other education the adults may 
pursue. 
                                                 
31
 We describe the representative household in Part II.a of this section. 
32
 The 2006 American Time Use Survey (BLS, 2007) finds that, on an average day, the typical American 
over the age of fifteen slept for about 8.6 hours, bringing his effective daily time endowment to 24 – 8.6 = 
15.4 hours. In our model, however, we assume that production is uninterrupted, and therefore each person’s 
time endowment is 24 hours. A three-member household, therefore, will have an endowment of 72 hours. 
33
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Given the above findings, we estimate teˆ  
to equal to 0.09583, and )ˆˆ1( tt el   to 
be 0.2111.  
 
f.) Investment in Physical and Human Capital: 
t
kt
y
i
ˆ
ˆ
and 
t
ht
y
i
ˆ
ˆ
 
We use data on the U.S. national accounts from the Economic Report of the 
President (CEA, 2007) to estimate 
t
kt
y
i
ˆ
ˆ
, the long-term investment in physical capital as a 
proportion of GDP.
35
 As in Cassou and Lansing (2003), our definition of investment 
includes consumer purchases of durable goods, residential fixed investment, changes in 
private inventories, and investment in non-residential structures, as well as in equipment 
and software.
36
 For the 1959-2005 time period, the mean value of 
t
kt
y
i
ˆ
ˆ
 was 0.2453.  
Our measure of the long-term human capital investment as a proportion of GDP, 
t
ht
y
i
ˆ
ˆ
, includes private sector expenditures on education, and on research and development 
(R&D).  We obtained R&D data from National Patterns of R&D Resources (NSF, 2007), 
and private education expenditure figures from OECD Statistics (OECD, 2006). Between 
1997 and 2004, 
t
ht
y
i
ˆ
ˆ
 averaged 0.0384.  
  
                                                 
35
 See “Statistical Table B-1: Gross Domestic Product, 1959-2006,” (CEA, 2007). 
36
 To obtain total investment for a given year using Table B-1 in CEA, 2007, we must therefore combine 
the total amount of gross private domestic investment and the private consumption of durable goods. 
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g.) Stock of Physical and Human Capital, and Their Ratio: 
t
t
y
k
ˆ
ˆ
 , 
t
t
y
h
ˆ
ˆ
 and 
t
t
k
h
ˆ
ˆ
 
To gauge 
t
t
y
k
ˆ
ˆ
, the stock of physical capital as a proportion of total output, we use 
data collected by Turner, Tamura, Mulholland and Baier (2007), whose time series 
covers the time period from 1840 to 2000 at ten-year intervals. Turner et al. (2007) use 
Gallman (1960) to derive the physical capital stock during the 1840-1920 period, and 
then rely on the Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth series (BEA, 1999) for the period 
until 2000.
37
 Figure IV.3 depicts the historical development of the 
t
t
y
k
ˆ
ˆ
 ratio. We estimate 
the long-term value of 
t
t
y
k
ˆ
ˆ
to be 3.1424.
38
  
 Compared to results obtained by other studies, this figure appears conservative: 
Cassou and Lansing (2003), for instance, used a value of 2.61, and data from the Fiscal 
Year 2007 edition of Analytical Perspectives – Budget of the United States (OMB, 2006) 
suggest an estimate of about 4.28.
39
 
To estimate the ratio of human to physical capital, 
t
t
k
h
ˆ
ˆ
, we use Jorgenson and 
Fraumeni’s (1992) lifetime labor-income based estimates of human wealth, which 
                                                 
37
 Katz and Herman (1997) revisit and improve the Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth estimates by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
38
 This value is obtained by taking the arithmetic mean of the observations in Turner, Tamura, Mulholland 
and Baier (2007). 
39
 To estimate total capital from Analytical Perspectives (OMB, 2006), we take the sum of publicly and 
privately owned physical capital assets as given by Table 13-4 in the report. We use Johnston and 
Williamson’s (2007) GDP estimates to obtain an approximate ratio of the physical capital stock to 
aggregate output. 
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encompass both market and non-market labor activities.
40
 Figure IV.4 depicts how the 
stock of human capital compared to the gross domestic product between the years 1947 
and 1986.
41
 The mean value of 
t
t
y
h
ˆ
ˆ
 
during this period was 64.11, indicating the ratio of 
human to physical capital can be estimated to be 
t
t
k
h
ˆ
ˆ
 = 20.4.
42
 
FIGURE VI.3 – PHYSICAL CAPITAL AS A PROPORTION OF OUTPUT IN THE U.S. ECONOMY, 1840-2000 
 
Source: Turner, Tamura, Mulholland and Baier (2007) and author’s calculations.  
                                                 
40
 The lifetime labor income-based approach yields much higher estimates of the human capital stock than 
do studies which employ a cost-based approach, such as Kendrick (1976). Cassou and Lansing (2003) point 
to Davies and Whalley (1989) for a comprehensive overview of previous attempts to estimate the stock of 
human capital. 
41
Gross domestic estimates in current dollars were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2007). 
42
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FIGURE VI.4 – HUMAN CAPITAL AS A PROPORTION OF OUTPUT IN THE U.S. ECONOMY, 1947-1986 
Source: Jorgenson and Fraumeni (2007), Bureau of Economic Analysis (2007), and author’s calculations. 
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II. Tax Code Parameters 
a.) Representative Household for the Individual Income Tax 
To derive a typical marginal tax rate schedule for the individual income tax, 
whose parameters we later estimate, we first construct a representative household based 
on U.S. demographic and tax revenue data. 
We assume that the representative household consists of two married parents who 
file joint tax returns. According to the Internal Revenue Service, during the 2005 tax year, 
taxpayers who filed jointly as married couples paid over $671 billion in income taxes, 
which amounts to 71.8 percent of the total $935 billion for all taxpayers (IRS, Pub. 1304). 
For a proportional breakdown of individual income taxes paid according to filing status, 
see Figure IV.5. 
 
 
FIGURE VI.5 – PROPORTIONAL  BREAKDOWN OF INDIVIDUAL TAXES PAID BY FILING STATUS 
 
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Publication 1304 (Tax Year 2005) and author’s calculations. 
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Based on U.S. women’s fertility data, the representative household is assumed to 
have only one dependent child. This estimate is obtained by taking the average number of 
children ever had by women between the ages of 15 and 44, as given by the Current 
Population Survey (CPS, 2005).
43
 
 
b.) Level (   ) and Slope (n) of the Tax Code for the Individual Income Tax 
Figure IV.6 shows a typical family’s marginal and average tax rate schedule 
during the 2005 tax year. It only considers effective tax rates that originate from the 
federal individual income tax, and does not consider other redistribution programs. For  
marginal tax rate schedules that take into account liability and benefits created by, for 
instance, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), child and education tax credits, or FICA 
taxes,
44
 see Hassett (2005), or Hassett and Moore (2005). 
Figure IV.7 plots the average tax rate schedule against the income ratio, 
calculated by dividing a representative household’s taxable income45 by the mean 2005 
taxable income of $67,595.
46
 Furthermore, the regression line in Figure IV.7 indicates 
that the level and slope of the pre-reform tax code is          , and n = 0.646, 
                                                 
43
 According to the Current Population Survey’s report Fertility of American Women - June 2004 (CPS, 
2005), 17.2 percent of women between the ages of 15 and 44 had one child, 21.9 percent had two children, 
10.8 had three, and 44.6 percent did not have any. 3.6 percent of women in this age group had four children, 
1.5 percent had five or six, and 0.3 percent had seven or more. We calculate the approximate number of 
children a typical woman has by taking a weighted average as follows:  
 
average number of children per woman = (44.6%) (0) + (17.2%) (1) + (21.9%) (2) + (10.8%) (3) + 
+ (3.6%) (4) + (1.5%) (5.5) + (0.3%) (7) = 1.1815, which we round off to 1 child per woman 
 
44
 Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes, also known as payroll taxes, are imposed by the 
federal government on both employees and employers, and finance Social Security and Medicare. 
45
 Because of the standard deduction ($10,000 for a married couple filing jointly), personal exemptions 
($3,200 per person) and the deduction for dependents ($800 per dependent), the first 20,400 dollars of 
family income are tax-free. 
46
 During the 2005 tax year, there were 52,505,729 tax returns filed jointly by married couples, which 
accounted for $3,549,102,642,000 in taxable income. We obtain the mean taxable income by dividing the 
latter amount by the number of tax returns filed. 
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respectively. To obtain these estimates, we take logarithms of the following relationship 
between the income ratio and the corresponding average individual tax rate, both indexed 
by taxable income level: 
  nipi RatioIncomeRateTaxIndividualAverage 
 
    nipi RatioIncomeRateTaxIndividualAverage lnln 
 
   ipi RatioIncomenRateTaxIndividualAverage lnlnln  
 
To obtain estimates of the tax code parameters, we run a simple ordinary least squares 
(OLS) log-log regression, as specified by the expression above.
  
 
FIGURE VI.6 – MARGINAL AND AVERAGE TAX RATE SCHEDULE FOR A REPRESENTATIVE HOUSEHOLD, 2005 
 
 Source: Author’s calculations. 
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FIGURE VI.7 –AVERAGE TAX RATE SCHEDULE FOR A REPRESENTATIVE HOUSEHOLD, 2005 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
c.) Business Tax Rate (   )  
The corporation tax, described in Section C of Chapter II, has a graduated 
marginal tax schedule. Most corporate income, however, is taxed at a 35 percent rate. We 
therefore use the statutory 35 percent as the business tax rate for calibration purposes. 
 
d.) Double Taxation of Dividends ( )  
Since the passage of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) 
in 2003, dividends are no longer taxed at the individual’s marginal income tax rate, but 
rather are subject to the capital gains rate schedule with the highest applicable rate of 15 
percent.  Since the mean taxable income is $67,595,
47
 and according to Figure VI.6 
would be taxed at the 15 percent marginal rate, we can, for simplicity, assume that there 
is a pre-JGTRRA double taxation of dividends:    = 1.  
                                                 
47
 See footnote 46.  
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e.) Exemptions and Deductions as a Proportion of GDP    
We use Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax return data for the 1996-2005 time 
period to calibrate  , a long-term measure of the total amount of exemptions and 
deductions taken by the average taxpayer in proportion to GDP. For each year, we first 
subtract the amount of taxable income (TaxInc) from the total adjusted gross income 
(AGI) to derive an implied total amount of exemptions and deductions.
48
 We then divide 
this number by the nominal gross domestic product, as given by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, to obtain an annual proportion. These have been fairly constant over time, as 
can be seen in Figure IV.8. Finally,   is the arithmetic mean of the annual proportions: 
 
 
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FIGURE VI.8 – EXEMPTIONS AND  DEDUCTIONS AS A PROPORTION OF  THE U.S. GDP, 1996-2005 
 
Source: Internal Revenue Service (2007), Bureau of Economic Analysis (2007) and author’s calculations. 
                                                 
48
 This number differs from the total amount of exemptions and deductions taken as given by the IRS. In 
some cases, total exemptions and deductions can exceed gross adjusted income, and therefore cannot be 
fully applied in the calculation of taxable income.  
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f.) Expensing of Physical and Human Capital Investment: k  and h  
 To calibrate k , the proportion of physical capital investment that firms can 
expense, we employ a calibration strategy suggested by Cassou and Lansing (2003). In 
particular, we choose k  such that the amount of expensed investment, given by ktk i , 
equals tkˆ , a measure of total capital depreciation: 
tktk ki 
ˆ
 
t
kt
k
k
i


ˆ
   
For simplicity, to obtain a value for ˆ , we use a standard linear law of motion: 
  tktt kik ˆ11    
Let us now divide both sides by tk : 
ˆ11 
t
kt
t
t
k
i
k
k
  
In the balanced growth path, physical capital stock and aggregate output grow at 
the same rate 
t
t
t
t
k
k
y
y 11 lnln   . We can therefore express 
t
t
k
k 1
 
as 
e , and continue to 
isolate ˆ : 
 ˆ1
t
kt
k
i
e
 
 e
k
i
t
kt 1ˆ   
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We use our previous estimates of  
t
kt
y
i
ˆ
ˆ
and 
t
t
y
k
ˆ
ˆ
 to estimate 
t
kt
k
i
and ˆ : 
07806.0
1424.3
2453.0
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ

t
t
t
kt
t
kt
y
k
y
i
k
i
 
0593.007806.011ˆ 0186.0  ee
k
i
t
kt 
 
Given these estimates, we can now calibrate k  : 
7597.0
07806.0
0593.0ˆ

t
kt
k
k
i

  
 
According to the National Patterns of R&D Resources (NSF, 2007), industry 
expenditures on research and development averaged 1.78 percent of the gross domestic 
product during 1959-2005. Privately-funded R&D investment is largely tax-deductible, 
while private education expenditures are not. We can use our estimate of 
t
ht
y
i
ˆ
ˆ
from the 
previous section to approximate h , the proportion of human capital investment that can 
be expensed: 
4626.0
0384.0
0178.0
ˆ
0178.0

t
ht
h
y
i

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g.) Calibration Summary 
 Tables VI.1 and VI.2 summarize the characteristics of the U.S. economy, as 
estimated earlier in this chapter, and the parameters of the tax code, respectively. We use 
the calibration procedure specified in Section E of Chapter V to calculate the endogenous 
parameters of the model for the three different values of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution (IES) in labor supply  – 0.25 (low), 0.5 (intermediate) and 1 (high). Table 
VI.3 summarizes the results.  
The middle column, which contains endogenous parameters for the intermediate 
IES value, is highlighted in bold, as we will use these estimates to calculate the balanced 
growth path characteristics and the transition dynamics, associated with replacing the 
graduated income tax with a revenue-neutral flat tax. In Appendix B, we perform a 
sensitivity analysis in which we recalculate the results for the low and high values of IES. 
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TABLE VI.1 – CALIBRATION: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY 
 
Characteristics of the U.S. Economy 
 
 
discount factor 
 
 
  
 
0.9615 
 
long-term growth rate 
 
 
ˆ  
 
0.0186 
 
labor share 
 
 
1  
 
0.649 
 
capital share 
 
 
  
 
0.351 
 
time in market work 
 
 
tt el ˆ
ˆ1   
 
0.2111 
 
time in education 
 
 
teˆ  
 
0.09583 
 
leisure time 
 
 
tlˆ
 
 
0.69306 
 
investment in physical capital 
t
kt
y
i
ˆ
ˆ
 
 
0.2453 
 
investment in human capital 
t
ht
y
i
ˆ
ˆ
 
 
0.0384 
 
physical capital stock 
t
t
y
k
ˆ
ˆ
 
 
3.1424 
 
human-to-physical capital ratio 
t
t
k
h
ˆ
ˆ
 
 
20.4 
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TABLE VI.2 – CALIBRATION: TAX CODE PARAMETERS 
  
 
Tax Code Parameters 
 
 
level of tax code for the 
individual income tax 
 
 
p  
 
0.105 
 
slope of marginal tax rate for 
the individual income tax 
 
 
n  
 
0.646 
 
business tax rate 
 
 
b  
 
0.35 
 
double taxation of dividends 
 
 
  
 
1 
 
exemptions and deductions as a 
proportion of GDP 
 
 
  
 
0.188 
 
expensing of physical capital 
investment 
 
 
k  
 
0.7597 
 
 
expensing of human capital 
investment 
 
 
h  
 
0.4626 
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TABLE VI.3 – CALIBRATION: ENDOGENOUS PARAMETERS 
 
intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution in labor 
supply ( ) 
0.25 
(low) 
0.5 
(medium) 
1 
(high) 
  5 3 2 
 
z 
 
 
0.123366 
 
 
0.123366 
 
 
0.123366 
 
 
Ak 
 
 
1.764785 
 
 
1.764785 
 
 
1.764785 
 
 
Ah 
 
 
1.115687 
 
 
1.159327 
 
 
1.339508 
 
 
p1 
 
 
0.28124 
 
 
0.358975 
 
 
0.531785 
 
 
p2 
 
 
0.453955 
 
 
0.453955 
 
 
0.453955 
 
 
δk 
 
 
0.21544 
 
 
0.21544 
 
 
0.21544 
 
 
δh 
 
 
0.003448 
 
 
0.004904 
 
 
0.010386 
 
 
v 
 
 
0.027837 
 
 
0.039591 
 
 
0.083846 
 
 
B 
 
 
0.893989 
 
 
0.140365 
 
 
0.064623 
 
 
ψ 
 
 
0.10984 
 
 
0.10984 
 
 
0.10984 
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B. Flat Tax: Balanced Growth Path 
a.) Parameters of a Hall-Rabushka Revenue-Neutral Flat Tax 
The most salient feature of the Hall-Rabushka (1995) flat tax proposal is its 
introduction of a single marginal tax rate  on both labor and business income:
bp   . The marginal tax schedule is not graduated: n = 0. 
We assume that the tax reform is revenue-neutral: The expected tax revenue at the 
time of reform constitutes the same proportion of output as the pre-reform tax receipts did. 
Immediately after the implementation of the flat tax, parameter ψ remains constant at its 
pre-reform value ψ = 0.10984. Using equation (28), we calculate that, to achieve revenue 
neutrality, the single marginal tax rate bp    must equal 21.909 percent. 
Business income is taxed only once, and is not subject to either the individual 
income tax or the capital gains tax. As a consequence, the Hall-Rabushka proposal 
eliminates the double taxation of dividends:   = 0. All physical investment expenditures 
are written off during the first year on the individual level. Investment in physical capital, 
in other words, is fully expensed: k = 1. No changes, however, are made to the 
expensing of human capital: h = 0.4626.  Finally, we assume that personal deductions 
and exemptions make up the same proportion of aggregate output as they did before the 
reform:   = 0.188. 
Table VI.4 summarizes the above tax code parameters for the revenue-neutral 
Hall-Rabushka flat tax reform. 
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TABLE VI.4 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TAX CODE PARAMETERS 
  
 
Tax Code Parameters for the Flat Tax 
 
 
level of tax code for the 
individual income tax 
= single marginal tax rate 
 
 
p   
 
0.21909 
 
slope of marginal tax rate for 
the individual income tax 
 
 
n  
 
0 
 
business tax rate 
= single marginal tax rate 
 
 
b   
 
0.21909 
 
double taxation of dividends 
 
 
  
 
0 
 
exemptions and deductions as a 
proportion of GDP 
 
 
  
 
0.188 
 
expensing of physical capital 
investment 
 
 
k  
 
1 
 
expensing of human capital 
investment 
 
 
h  
 
0.4626 
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b.) Characteristics of the Balanced Growth Path (Intermediate IES) 
 Table IV.5 summarizes the characteristics of the post-reform balanced growth 
path for an intermediate value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) in labor 
supply (  = 0.5). For the balanced growth path characteristics of a flat tax model with a 
low and high IES ( = 0.25 and  = 1, respectively), see the sensitivity analysis in 
Appendix B. 
After the flat tax is introduced, the long-term growth rate increases to 1.911 
percent. The representative household spends 21.6 percent of its time endowment 
engaged in market work, 9.8 percent in education, and the remaining 68.6 percent in 
leisure activities. In the balanced growth path, consumption makes up 56.2 percent of the 
gross domestic product. Investment in physical capital comprises 29.6 percent of GDP, 
whereas human capital investment accounts for 3.2 percent. Consequently, in the long 
run, the ratio of physical capital stock to aggregate output tends to 3.783, and the human-
to-physical capital stock ratio approaches 15.004. 
Compared to the pre-reform balanced growth path with a graduated-rate federal 
income tax, calibrated in Section A of this chapter, the long-term growth rate rises slightly 
from 1.86 to 1.911 percent – a difference of 0.05 percentage points. We can therefore 
conclude that the introduction of a revenue-neutral Hall-Rabushka flat tax has, in the long 
run, a mildly positive effect on the rate of economic growth. This is consistent with some 
previous studies, such as Lucas (1990), Stokey and Rebelo (1995) and the original 
Cassou and Lansing (2003), that indicated that switching to a flat tax would lead to only a 
slight increase in the economic growth rate. These results are less in line with studies that 
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suggest a quantitatively large influence of tax policies on economic growth, such as King 
and Rebelo (1990), or Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993).   
After the flat tax is implemented, furthermore, the representative household 
spends slightly more time in market work and education, with a corresponding decrease 
in the proportion of time spent in leisure activities. As a proportion of GDP, the reform 
increases investment in physical capital, but reduces human capital investment. 
Accordingly, in the new balanced growth path, the ratio of physical capital stock to 
output increases, while the ratio of human-to-physical capital stock falls. 
To explain how these changes in balanced growth path values occurred, we 
consider how optimal decision rules react to changes in tax code parameters.
49
 Compared 
to the pre-reform situation, the flat tax reform – by introducing a single marginal tax rate 
of 21.909% ( bp   = 0.21909; n  = 0) - decreased the business tax rate (from b  = 
0.35), increased the base level of personal tax rates (from p  = 0.105), and completely 
flattened the personal tax rate schedule (from n = 0.646).  
In the case of the level of physical capital investment, as well as time spent in 
market work and education, the positive effects of lower business tax rates and of the rate 
schedule flattening outweigh the negative effect of higher base rate for the personal tax 
rate. For human capital investment, the positive effect of switching to a flat tax schedule 
is outweighed by the negative effects of the decrease in the business tax rate and of the 
increase in the personal tax base rate. 
  
                                                 
49
 See Section C: Optimal Decision Rules in Chapter V. 
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TABLE VI.5 – FLAT TAX REFORM: BALANCED GROWTH PATH CHARACTERISTICS (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
 
Characteristics of the Balanced Growth Path 
After the Flat Tax Reform ( intermediate IES = 0.5 ) 
 
 
Comparison 
Before 
the 
reform 
 
Difference 
 
 
long-term growth rate 
 
 
  
 
0.01911 
 
 
0.0186 
 
+ 0.00051 
 
time in market work 
 
 
tt el 1  
 
0.216 
 
0.2111 
 
+ 0.0049 
 
time in education 
 
 
te  
 
0.098 
 
0.09583 
 
+ 0.002 
 
leisure time 
 
 
tl  
 
0.686 
 
0.69306 
 
- 0.007 
 
consumption / GDP 
 
t
t
y
c
 
 
0.562 
 
0.606 
 
- 0.044 
 
investment in physical capital 
t
kt
y
i
 
 
0.296 
 
0.2453 
 
+ 0.0507 
 
investment in human capital 
t
ht
y
i
 
 
0.032 
 
0.0384 
 
- 0.006 
 
physical capital stock 
t
t
y
k
 
 
3.783 
 
3.1424 
 
+ 0.641 
 
human-to-physical capital ratio 
t
t
k
h
 
 
15.004 
 
20.4 
 
- 5.396 
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C. Flat Tax: Transition Dynamics 
 
After the introduction of a revenue-neutral Hall-Rabushka flat tax, the model 
economy takes some time to settle into the new balanced growth rate. Figures VI.9 to 
VI.27 depict the transition dynamics of variables such as the economic growth rate, time 
in market work and education, leisure time, utility, and others. Some of the diagrams 
depict long-term time series of 100 years, while others focus on the short run and only 
display the variable dynamics for ten years following the tax reform. 
Figures VI.9 and VI.10 show the long- and short-term transition dynamics of the 
expected economic growth rate, respectively. With an intermediate IES, the model 
economy’s growth slows down slightly during the first post-reform year: The growth rate 
falls from the pre-reform value of 1.86% to 1.821%.
50
 The next year, however, growth 
rebounds to an impressive 3.219%. In the years that follow, the growth rate gradually 
decreases until it reaches, after approximately 55 years, the new balanced growth path 
value of 1.911 percent. 
To understand what drives the changes in economic growth rates is, we examine 
the production function (5): 
     11 ttttt elhzky  
The stock of physical capital tk  grows faster after the reform is implemented 
(since 
t
kt
y
i
 
rises), while the accumulation of human capital th  slows down somewhat, as 
t
ht
y
i
 
decreases. The changing rates of physical and human capital accumulation, then, 
                                                 
50
 We assume that the economy is on a balanced growth path before the flat tax is implemented. 
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appear to have countervailing effects on the rate of economic growth. An examination of 
the transition dynamics for the proportion of time the representative household spends in 
market work  tt el 1  suggests,
51
 however, that time allocation decisions may, in fact, 
be the driving force behind the changes in the economic growth rate. Like the growth rate, 
the proportion of time spent in market work at first falls fairly significantly, before it 
rebounds, and then gradually drops off to its new balanced growth path level, which is 
still higher than the pre-reform value. 
We see, therefore, that the introduction of a flat tax is likely to accelerate 
economic growth in the long run. The long-term benefits, however, come at the cost of a 
temporary slowdown or even recession during the first post-reform year – a politically 
unpalatable consequence that is likely to make the policy a less attractive option to 
politicians. During the second year, however, the economic growth rate rebounds to a 
high level, and remains relatively high, albeit decreasing, afterwards. The high economic 
growth rates after the first year are likely to be popular with voters. 
 These results suggest that the timing of the flat tax reform may have important 
political consequences for incumbents. Due to the risk of an economic slowdown in the 
very short term, an incumbent would be unlikely to introduce a flat tax one year before 
the election, fearing that the low economic growth during the first post-reform year could 
lead to his electoral defeat. The incumbent, however, might find it politically expedient to 
introduce the reform two or more years before the election.     
Lower economic growth could make a politician’s re-election less likely for a 
variety of intuitively plausible reasons. Most obviously, lower economic growth is 
                                                 
51
 See Figures VI.14 and VI.15, below. 
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associated with greater unemployment, and with relatively sluggish increases in living 
standards. Dissatisfied voters may, as a result, decide to vote for the incumbent’s 
opponent. Alternatively, voters may consider economic growth to be a good proxy for the 
incumbent’s ability to govern – a valued trait that may be difficult to observe directly 
(Persson and Tabellini, 1990). For high economic growth rates, the reverse of the above 
considerations applies: Politicians may find it easier to win re-election as voters enjoy 
improved living standards, a lower unemployment rate, and if they perceive the 
incumbent to be a competent public servant. 
Empirical evidence on the effect of economic conditions on the probability of re-
election, however, is somewhat mixed. A recent study of voting behavior in a sample of 
74 countries over the 1960-2003 time period by Brender and Drazen (2005) found that 
higher growth rates of GDP per capita raised the incumbent’s probability of re-election 
only in less democratic countries and new democracies. Using regularly updated data 
from U.S. presidential elections, on the other hand, Fair (2006) estimates that higher 
economic growth has consistently had a positive effect on the likelihood that the 
incumbent will get re-elected. 
One should note, also, that the model does not take into account business cycles. 
It may well be that a robust, business cycle-related economic expansion could outweigh, 
or at least mitigate, the effects of a tax reform-induced slowdown, and thus make the 
post-implementation transition period less problematic. 
  
Hlavac    73 
FIGURE VI.9 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE VI.10 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE 
 (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
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 FIGURE VI.11 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – INDEX OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
 
 
 
Figure VI.11 tracks the dynamic of the gross domestic product, or aggregate 
output, of the model economy. We index aggregate output to equal 1 at the time of 
reform. Values on the vertical axis therefore reflect how many times larger output is at 
any given time, given by the horizontal axis, than it was when the flat tax was introduced. 
By examining the solid line, which represents GDP dynamics after the introduction of the 
flat tax, we see that output doubles after approximately 31 years,
52
 and that, 100 years 
after the tax reform, the economy is expected to be almost 7.5 times larger.
53
 The dashed 
line represents how gross domestic product would have evolved in the absence of tax 
reform:  output would have doubled after 37 years, and, 100 years after the moment the 
                                                 
52
 More specifically, the index of aggregate output equals 1.9989 during the 31
st
 year after the flat tax was 
implemented, and 2.0379 during the 32
nd
 year. 
53
 In the 100
th
 year after the tax reform, the aggregate output index equals 7.4829. 
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flat tax would otherwise have been adopted, the economy would be only 6.4 times larger. 
If the United States adopts the flat tax, then, a hundred years after the reform its 
aggregate output would be expected to be about 17 percent larger that it would have been 
in the absence of any tax reform.  
Figures IV.12 and IV.13 depict what proportion of its time the representative 
households spends in education, expressed as a value between 0 and 1. During the first 
year, this proportion drops from the initial value of 0.096583 down to about 0.094, and 
then it gradually rises until it reaches a new balanced growth value of almost 0.098.  
The proportion of time spent in market work follows a similar trajectory, as can 
be seen in Figures IV.14 and IV.15. The first year brings a decrease from 0.2111 to a little 
more than 0.207, and then it grows until it eventually stabilizes at 0.216.  
Since both the proportion of time spent in education and in market work declines 
one year after the reform, and then rebounds to higher than initial values, the proportion 
of time the representative household can spend on leisure activities must increase at first, 
before falling to lower values. Indeed, Figures IV.16 and IV.17 show that the proportion 
of leisure time spikes in the first year at a value of 0.699, and that it then gradually falls 
to about 0.686 on the new balanced growth path. 
Figures IV.18 and IV.19 focus on the transition dynamics for the wage and 
interest rates. We see that the wage rate gradually rises from approximately 0.048 to 
0.053, whereas the interest rate falls from 0.112 to 0.093. Both the wage and the interest 
rate assume their new values smoothly, without any significant departures during the first 
year after the tax reform. 
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FIGURE VI.12 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – TIME IN EDUCATION (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE VI.13 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – TIME IN EDUCATION (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
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 FIGURE VI.14 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – TIME IN MARKET WORK (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
 
 
 
FIGURE VI.15 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – TIME IN MARKET WORK  
(INTERMEDIATE IES) 
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FIGURE VI.16 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – LEISURE TIME (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
 
 
 
FIGURE VI.17 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – LEISURE TIME 
(INTERMEDIATE IES) 
 
0.684
0.686
0.688
0.690
0.692
0.694
0.696
0.698
0.700
-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
ti
m
e
 s
p
e
n
t 
in
 l
e
is
u
re
 a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
years after tax reform
0.684
0.686
0.688
0.690
0.692
0.694
0.696
0.698
0.700
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
ti
m
e
 s
p
e
n
t 
in
 l
e
is
u
re
 a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
years after tax reform
Hlavac    79 
 
FIGURE VI.18 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – WAGE RATE (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
 
 
 
FIGURE VI.19 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – INTEREST  RATE (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
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Figures IV.20 and IV.21 trace the representative household’s utility, which – as 
can be seen from the utility function given by (1) – depends positively on consumption 
and leisure, and negatively on time spent in market work or education. In these diagrams 
and ones that follow, the solid line depicts the post-reform transition dynamics, while the 
dashed line shows transition dynamics in the absence of tax reform. 
The diagrams measure utility in utils, a numerical unit whose values, however, 
represent ordinal, rather than cardinal, utility:
54
 A household whose utility equals 8 utils, 
for instance, is clearly more satisfied than one with a utility of 4 utils, but is not 
necessarily twice as happy. Assuming that a household’s preferences over consumption 
and leisure meet the assumptions of completeness, transitivity and continuity, any 
numerical utility ranking (U) can be transformed into another set of numbers by the 
function F(U), as long as it is order-preserving (Nicholson, 2005).
55
 
Following the introduction of the flat tax, the representative household’s utility 
falls, and does not reach its original level until between three or four years later. Figures 
IV.22 and IV.23 depict – on an annual basis - changes in the representative household’s 
utility over time.  
 
  
  
                                                 
54
 In other words, utility values record the relative desirability of consumption-leisure bundles. 
55
 Function F(x) is order preserving, for instance, if its first derivative is greater than zero for all values of x. 
(In other words, the function slopes upwards everywhere.) 
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FIGURE VI.20 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – UTILITY  (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE VI.21 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – UTILITY 
(INTERMEDIATE IES) 
 
  
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
u
ti
li
ty
 i
n
 u
ti
ls
years after tax reform
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
u
ti
li
ty
 i
n
 u
ti
ls
years after tax reform
Hlavac    82 
FIGURE VI.22 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – UTILITY CHANGE  (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
 
 
FIGURE VI.23 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – UTILITY CHANGE 
(INTERMEDIATE IES) 
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Since measures of welfare denominated in utils can only represent relative utility 
differences and do not have an absolute interpretation, economists often use 
consumption-equivalent variations to express utility differences in more tangible terms. 
The consumption-equivalent variation is the amount of additional consumption that, at a 
given point in time, would make a household as well off in the absence of a policy 
change as it would be if the change were implemented. Consumption equivalents have 
been used as a method of quantitative welfare analysis in a variety of economic 
applications, including Social Security and pension reform (Conesa and Krueger, 1999; 
Bütler, 2000), studies on income inequality (Krueger and Perri, 2003), the distributional 
effects of child labor legislation (Krueger and Donohue, 2005), and tax code 
progressiveness (Conesa and Krueger, 2006). 
In this paper, we translate utility changes – whether these represent how 
household utilities change over time after the implementation of the flat tax, or express 
the difference between the post-reform utilities and what they would have been in the 
absence of tax reform at a given point in time - into changes in the representative 
household’s consumption as a proportion of total output, and also use the concept of a 
multiplicative consumption-equivalent welfare gain, as described in Lucas (2003). We 
express equivalent consumption as a proportion of aggregate gross domestic product to 
take into account our earlier simplifying assumption that, at the time of reform, total 
output equaled 1, and to provide a measure of welfare changes that would be intuitively 
easy to grasp. 
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First, we examine how the well-being of the representative household changes 
over time after the introduction of a Hall-Rabushka flat tax. Equation (1) suggests that the 
representative household’s utility at time t can be expressed as: 
  tttt lhVcu  1,ln      ( 29 ) 
The consumption-equivalent variation tc  denotes the extra utility that the 
representative household enjoys at time t expressed in terms of consumption, compared 
to 0tu , its utility at the time of reform. The following must, therefore, be true: 
   01,ln  ttttt ulhVcc     ( 30 ) 
To isolate tc , we first exponentiate both sides of (30) with the base of e, and 
then rearrange the expression: 
                    01,  tutttt elhVcc       
  01,  tutttt elhVcc     ( 31 ) 
We now plug (2) into (31) to replace  tt lhV 1, : 
            01  tutttt elBhcc

     ( 32 )    
Finally, we divide (32) by ty , the aggregate output at time t, to express the consumption-
equivalent variation as a proportion of the gross domestic product: 
 
t
u
ttt
t
t
y
elBhc
y
c t 01 



    ( 33 ) 
  
Hlavac    85 
Figures IV.24 and IV.25 show how representative household’s utility, expressed 
in terms of consumption-equivalent variations as a proportion of aggregate output, 
changes over time in the short and the long run, respectively. Compared to its well-being 
at the time of reform, the representative household becomes, during the first post-reform 
year, worse off by an amount of consumption equivalent to 2.32 percent of the gross 
domestic product. Over time, this utility gap closes, and the representative household 
reaches the initial level of well-being after a little more than three years.  
The temporary decrease in household utility following the introduction of a Hall-
Rabushka flat tax can, along with the initial slowdown in economic growth, detract from 
the reform’s political acceptability. As long as the citizens’ satisfaction influences how 
they vote, an incumbent may be reluctant to enact a flat tax for fear of losing an election.  
To the extent that utility considerations outweigh concerns about economic growth in the 
voters’ minds, incumbents would find it politically very risky to implement a flat tax 
reform less than three or four years before an election. Reforming the tax system closer to 
the election might mean that the typical household would find itself worse off on election 
day that it was at the time of time reform, and would be more likely to vote for the 
opposition party or candidate.  In the context of the four-year political cycle that applies 
to presidential politics in the United States, these utility effects may well make the 
adoption of a Hall-Rabushka flat tax politically infeasible. 
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FIGURE VI.24 – FLAT TAX REFORM: LONG-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS 
PATH OF UTILITY OVER TIME:  CONSUMPTION-EQUIVALENT VARIATION AS A PROPORTION OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT 
(INTERMEDIATE IES) 
 
FIGURE VI.25 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS 
PATH OF UTILITY OVER TIME:  CONSUMPTION-EQUIVALENT VARIATION AS A PROPORTION OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT 
(INTERMEDIATE IES) 
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In addition to examining how utility changes over time, we might wish to 
consider what the effects of introducing a flat tax on the representative household’s well-
being would be, when compared to how well off the household would have been in the 
absence of any tax reform. We perform this analysis, first, by computing consumption-
equivalent variations as a proportion of aggregate output, and then consider an alternative 
method that relies on the multiplicative welfare gain as proposed in Lucas (2003). 
Here, the consumption-equivalent variation tc  represents the additional utility 
that the representative household enjoys at time t expressed in terms of consumption, 
compared to the utility the household would have enjoyed at the same point in time in the 
absence of tax reform. More formally: 
     000111 1,ln1,ln ttttttt lhVcclhVc  ,    ( 34 ) 
where the superscript index 1 indicates post-reform values, while an index of 0 denotes 
values that would have been attained on the original balanced growth path, in the absence 
of any tax reform. 
We find tc  by getting rid of the logarithms on both sides of (34), and then 
shuffling the terms: 
           000111 1,1, ttttttt lhVcclhVc       
   110001 1,1, ttttttt lhVlhVccc     ( 35 ) 
We plug (2) into (35): 
                110001 11 ttttttt lhlhBccc       ( 36 )    
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Finally, we divide (36) by ty , the aggregate output at time t, to express the consumption-
equivalent variation as a proportion of the gross domestic product: 
    
t
tttttt
t
t
y
lhlhBcc
y
c
 110001 11 


    ( 37 ) 
Figure VI.26 shows the dynamics of the consumption-equivalent variation 
t
t
y
c
 as 
a proportion of aggregate income when we compare the post-reform and no-reform 
scenarios. Positive values of 
t
t
y
c
 indicate that, at time t, the representative household is 
better off than it would have been had the tax reform not taken place. Negative values, on 
the other hand, suggest that – at the given point in time - the household would have been 
better off without the changes in the tax code. Figure VI.26, then, suggests that, 
compared to a no-reform alternative, the introduction of the flat tax does not pay off – in 
terms of the utility opportunity cost  for the representative household – until the thirteenth 
post-reform year.  
The relatively long time period that elapses before the introduction of the flat tax 
raises the representative household’s utility above the level where it would have been had 
the reform not taken place suggests that, while the tax code change has benefits in the 
long run, it may lead to a short- to medium-term decrease in well-being. If voters’ 
concerns about their perceived well-being are an important consideration, and if they 
realize that they may have foregone utility in the years following the implementation of 
the Hall-Rabushka flat tax, they may be less likely to re-elect incumbents. As a result, the 
flat tax reform would be difficult to pass, as politicians would fear that it might cost them 
at the polls.   
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FIGURE VI.26 – FLAT TAX REFORM: LONG-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS 
UTILITY WITH VS. WITHOUT REFORM:  CONSUMPTION-EQUIVALENT VARIATION AS A PROPORTION OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT 
(INTERMEDIATE IES) 
  
Alternatively, we can express utility differences between the post-reform and no-
reform states in terms of a multiplicative welfare gain, as outlined in Lucas (2003).
56
 We 
begin with the following expression:: 
       000111 1,1ln1,ln tttttt lhVclhVc   ,    ( 38 ) 
where, again, the superscript indices 0 and 1 denote no-reform and post-reform values, 
respectively. The multiplicative welfare gain   can be interpreted as the proportion by 
which post-reform consumption exceeds what consumption would have been on the 
original, no-reform balanced growth path. After isolating   on the left-hand side of the 
equation, we obtain: 
     000111 1,11, tttttt lhVclhVc       
      110010 1,1,1 tttttt lhVlhVcc             
                                                 
56
 In his paper, Lucas (2003) simply uses the term “welfare gain.” 
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   
1
1,1,
0
11001



t
ttttt
c
lhVlhVc
      ( 39 )    
Finally, we plug (2) into (39) to find an expression that can be evaluated using our 
calibrated parameters: 
    
1
11
0
11001



t
ttttt
c
lhlhBc

     ( 40 ) 
 Because the underlying utility is the same, Figure IV.27 - which depicts the 
multiplicative welfare gain that results from the introduction of the Hall-Rabushka flat 
tax, as compared to a situation without any tax reform – indicates, like Figure IV.26 does, 
that the tax reform does not pay off, when considering the opportunity cost in terms of 
the representative household’s utility, until 13 years after its implementation. 
 
 
FIGURE VI.27 – FLAT TAX REFORM: LONG-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS 
UTILITY WITH VS. WITHOUT REFORM:  MULTIPLICATIVE WELFARE GAIN (INTERMEDIATE IES) 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Using a dynamic equilibrium model proposed by Cassou and Lansing (2003), and 
calibrated to fit empirical data about the U.S. economy, we have estimated the growth 
and utility effects of replacing the current graduated-rate federal income tax by a 
revenue-neutral Hall-Rabushka flat tax. 
We find that the flat tax reform increases long-term economic growth, and that the 
magnitude of this effect depends on the U.S. economy’s intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in labor supply (IES). For values of IES that range from 0.25 to 1, the 
introduction of a Hall-Rabushka flat tax increases the long-term economic growth rate by 
0.003 - 0.255 percentage points. 
A more intertemporally elastic labor supply results in a higher long-term 
economic growth rate and – due largely to compounding effects – a higher level of 
aggregate output in the decades following the reform. In the short run, however, higher 
IES may lead to greater fluctuations in economic growth rates and a longer-lasting 
temporary decrease of household utility. Such reactions are understandable, as higher IES 
means that households reconsider their intertemporal consumption and labor allocation 
more dramatically in response to changes in the tax code, leading to increased long-term 
productivity but also to a period of significant adjustment in the short run.  
 The transition dynamics exhibited similar patterns for all three values of IES that 
we examined (0.25, 0.5 and 1), as can be seen in Appendix B. When IES is assumed to be 
intermediate or high (0.5 or 1), the economic growth rate falls during the first year, 
rebounds rapidly, and then gradually decreases to its balanced growth path value. In the 
Hlavac    92 
scenario with a low IES (0.25), there is no decrease in the economic growth rate during 
the first post-reform year.   
Regardless of the value of IES, after the implementation of the flat tax, the 
representative household’s utility falls, and does not reach its pre-reform value until a few 
years later. The combination of a possible economic slowdown and temporarily 
decreased household satisfaction may make the flat tax reform seem unpalatable to some 
politicians, especially those worried about their re-election. Incumbents concerned about 
an upcoming election may, as a result, be inclined to carefully consider the political 
consequences of the flat tax reform in the timing of its adoption.  
 Immediately after the enactment of the flat tax reform, the representative 
household spends less time in education and market work. As the economy approaches 
the new balanced growth path, the proportion of time spent in education and work 
increases, and eventually exceeds its pre-reform values. The wage rate increases, and the 
interest rate falls. 
The long-term results of our simulation are consistent with Hall and Rabushka’s 
(1995) conjectures that their proposal, if implemented, would improve the performance 
of the U.S. economy, increase take-home wages, and stimulate work effort. 
 
The analysis presented in this paper has a number of limitations, which represent, 
in our view, an opportunity for further research. First and foremost, our results are based 
on a theoretical model which relies on assumptions about the form of utility and 
production functions, as well as on the assumption that government expenditure is 
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unproductive. Evidence from other empirical studies could give us some indication about 
the appropriateness of these assumptions.  
Although the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, passed in 2003, 
made dividends subject to the capital gains rate schedule on the individual level, we used 
decision rules derived from the assumption that there is full double taxation of dividends. 
One could bring the model closer to the current version of the tax code by deriving 
optimal decision rules that take into account the new treatment of dividends.  
In an influential essay, Friedman (1953) has argued that the usefulness of 
theoretical models should be judged not by the realism of their assumptions, but rather on 
the basis of the accuracy of their predictions. In the light of this proposition, one could 
attempt to determine the model’s predictive power by estimating it retrospectively for 
economies – for instance, in Central or Eastern Europe - that have adopted a flat tax 
comparable to the Hall-Rabushka proposal. 
The Cassou-Lansing model estimates the effects of a flat tax reform by looking at 
the behavior of a representative household. An interesting extension of this model could 
consider the distributional effects of tax reform. Instead of modeling the reactions of a 
single representative household, a modified model could consider how changes in the tax 
code would affect the work effort and investment decisions of various income groups. 
Equity considerations are important in deciding what tax policy to pursue, and extending 
our model to estimate the possible differential effects of a flat tax on several income 
groups could help policy-makers reach a judgment about the fairness of the reform. 
Finally, one could combine the modified Cassou-Lansing model with one that 
aims to explain business cycles. Since the revolutionary innovations introduced in Lucas 
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and Prescott (1971) and built upon in Kydland and Prescott (1982), dynamic equilibrium 
models have been commonly used to analyze business cycles (Rebelo, 2005; Royal 
Academy of the Science, 2004). In light of these advances, combining the Cassou-
Lansing model with a dynamic equilibrium model that explains short-term economic 
fluctuations should not be an insurmountable task. Such a combined model could 
improve our understanding of the interactions between tax reforms and the business 
cycles, and would shed more light on the possible political consequences of fundamental 
tax reform. 
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Appendix A: Derivation of Optimal Decision Rules 
 
This section summarizes the derivation of optimal decisions rules, as detailed in 
Cassou and Lansing (2003). To derive equilibrium decision rules, we solve the 
household’s problem – maximizing utility (1) given the budget constraint (3) specified in 
the basic framework of the model – using the Lagrangian: 
     



0
1)1(ln
t
thtktttttttttttt
t ciikrTelhwlBhcL    
After substituting (4) for tT : 
     
     thtkttththktkttbhthktkttb
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tttttpttttttttt
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We collect terms that contain tt kr , kti  and hti : 
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After plugging in equation (10) for pt , we obtain: 
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By differentiating the Lagrangian, we obtain the first-order conditions (FOCs) 
with respect to variables 1tk , 1th , tc , tl1 , and te : 
- FOC with respect to 1tk : 
57
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- FOC with respect to 1th :
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- FOC with respect to tc : 

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- FOC with respect to te : 
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  ( A.1e ) 
 
To obtain the optimal decision rules, we use the method of undetermined 
coefficients. Cassou and Lansing (2003) conjecture that the decision rules take the 
following form: 
    
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t
t
yd0
1
       ( A.4 ) 
  ttt lfel 01  ,      ( A.5 ) 
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where the constants 0a , 0b , 0d  and 0f  need to be determined. After plugging in the 
decision rules and equations (8), (9) into the first-order conditions for 1tk  and 1th , they 
obtain expressions for 0a  and 0b : 
k
ka



0  ; 
 










0
0
1
1
1
f
b
h
h


,  ( A.6 ), ( A.7 ) 
where 1
1


  denotes the household’s rate of time preference. To derive an 
expression for 0f , they substitute the profit-maximizing condition (7) for tw  into the 
FOC with respect to te , and also use the conjectured decision rules and the above 
expression for 0b :  
v
v
f
h
h






0      ( A.8 ) 
Substituting this result into (A.7) yields: 
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v
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h      ( A.9 ) 
One can now plug equation (7) into the FOC for tl1  (A.1d), and then use relations 
(A.1c), (A.5) and (A.8): 
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Using this result and given the aforementioned conjectured forms, Cassou and 
Lansing (2003) derive the optimal decision rules for )1( tt el    and te ,: 
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1 11)1(
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To find the decision rule for equilibrium consumption, they plug the profit-maximizing 
rules (6) and (7), as well as the human and physical capital investment rules (A.2) and 
(A.3) into the within-period budget constraint (3): 
    
     
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    ( A.15 ) 
Finally, Cassou and Lansing (2003) verify that the conjectured forms of the 
equilibrium decision rules are correct by showing that 0d  is constant. To do that, they 
rearrange the FOC for consumption: 
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t
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11
0
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 tttt lBhcyd  10     ( A.16 ) 
They rewrite (A.16) after plugging in equations (A.1c) and (A.1d): 
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   ( A.17 ) 
By plugging in the decision rule for equilibrium consumption (A.15) into the above 
expression and isolating 0d  on the left-hand side, one obtains a constant expression that 
validates the conjecture: 
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 ( A.18 ) 
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Appendix B: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Table B.1 summarizes the post-reform balanced growth path characteristics, if we 
estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) in labor supply to be relatively 
low at   = 0.25. As shown in Figures B.1 to B.19, the transition dynamics of most 
variables such as the index of aggregate output, the proportion of time spent in 
education/market work/leisure, the wage and interest rates, and utility (expressed in utils, 
consumption-equivalent variations, and as a multiplicative welfare gain) follow the same 
general pattern as they do with an intermediate value of IES ( = 0.5).  
With a low IES, one variable whose dynamics differ from those that would 
prevail with an intermediate IES is the economic growth rate. Unlike in the case where 
 = 0.5, the economic growth rate does not decrease during the first post-reform year 
when    = 0.25, making tax reform somewhat more palatable for politicians in the short-
run.  
Household utility falls during the first post-reform year, but then gradually 
rebounds until it reaches its balanced growth path level. As a result, the political 
implications of a flat tax reform, when labor supply is relatively inelastic over time and if 
households’ perceived well-being outweighs the economic growth rate as a factor in their 
voting decisions, may remain the same: Politicians might be unwilling to reform the tax 
system for fear of being punished at the polls by votes who had suffered adverse short-
term consequences. 
Figure B.3 shows how aggregate output evolves after the Hall-Rabushka flat tax 
is adopted (solid line) relative to how large it would have been in the absence of tax 
reform (dashed line), if IES is low (  = 0.25). If the flat tax is adopted, 100 years after 
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the reform we expect aggregate output to be about 11.4% higher than it would have been 
without changes in the tax code. Figure B.17 shows that, three years after the reform, 
household utility attains the value it had at the time of reform. Figures B.18 and B.19 
suggest that, compared to a no-reform alternative, the flat tax does not pay off – in 
household utility terms – until about 12 years after its implementation. 
 
Table B.2, on the other hand, provides the balanced growth path characteristics 
after the flat tax reform was enacted in an economy whose IES is estimated to be 
relatively high at  = 1. Figures B.20 to B.38 show that, for this value, the transition 
dynamics – in this case, including the economic growth rate - have, yet again, similar 
characteristics as those we saw with an intermediate value of IES. Even with a high IES, 
therefore, politicians will be wary about implementing the reform because of its potential 
short-term political implications. 
Figure B.22 depicts the output dynamics for a high level of IES (  = 1). 
According to the Cassou-Lansing model, 100 years after the adoption of the flat tax 
aggregate output will have increased by as much as 38.2 percent. Figure B.36 shows that, 
after the initial decrease, household utility reaches its reform-time value after a little more 
than four years. Figures B.37 and B.38 suggest that, when compared to the alternative of 
staying on the original, no-reform, balanced growth path, the flat tax will not yield higher 
household utility until as late as 19 years after its adoption. 
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 TABLE B.1 – FLAT TAX REFORM: BALANCED GROWTH PATH CHARACTERISTICS (LOW IES) 
 
  
 
Characteristics of the Balanced Growth Path 
After the Flat Tax Reform ( low IES = 0.25 ) 
 
 
Comparison 
Before 
the 
reform 
 
Difference 
 
 
long-term growth rate 
 
 
  
 
0.01863 
 
 
0.0186 
 
+ 0.00003 
 
time in market work 
 
 
tt el 1  
 
0.213 
 
0.2111 
 
+ 0.0019 
 
time in education 
 
 
te  
 
0.097 
 
0.09583 
 
+ 0.001 
 
leisure time 
 
 
tl  
 
0.690 
 
0.69306 
 
- 0.003 
 
consumption / GDP 
 
t
t
y
c
 
 
0.562 
 
0.606 
 
- 0.044 
 
investment in physical capital 
t
kt
y
i
 
 
0.296 
 
0.2453 
 
+ 0.0507 
 
investment in human capital 
t
ht
y
i
 
 
0.032 
 
0.0384 
 
- 0.006 
 
physical capital stock 
t
t
y
k
 
 
3.791 
 
3.1424 
 
+ 0.649 
 
human-to-physical capital ratio 
t
t
k
h
 
 
15.110 
 
20.4 
 
- 5.29 
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FIGURE B.1 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE (LOW IES) 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE B.2 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE 
(LOW IES)
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 FIGURE B.3 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – INDEX OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT (LOW IES) 
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FIGURE B.4 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – TIME IN EDUCATION (LOW IES) 
 
 
 
FIGURE B.5 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – TIME IN EDUCATION  (LOW IES) 
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FIGURE B.6 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – TIME IN MARKET WORK (LOW IES) 
 
 
 
FIGURE B.7 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – TIME IN MARKET WORK  
(LOW IES) 
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FIGURE B.8 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – LEISURE TIME (LOW IES) 
 
 
 
FIGURE B.9 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – LEISURE TIME 
(LOW IES)  
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FIGURE B.10 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – WAGE RATE (LOW IES) 
 
 
FIGURE B.11 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – INTEREST  RATE (LOW IES) 
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FIGURE B.12 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – UTILITY (LOW IES)  
 
 
FIGURE B.13 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – UTILITY 
(LOW IES) 
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FIGURE B.14 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – UTILITY CHANGE  (LOW IES) 
 
 
FIGURE B.15 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – UTILITY CHANGE 
(LOW IES) 
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FIGURE B.16 – FLAT TAX REFORM: LONG-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS 
PATH OF UTILITY OVER TIME:  CONSUMPTION-EQUIVALENT VARIATION AS A PROPORTION OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT 
(LOW IES) 
 
FIGURE B.17 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS 
PATH OF UTILITY OVER TIME:  CONSUMPTION-EQUIVALENT VARIATION AS A PROPORTION OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT 
(LOW IES) 
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FIGURE B.18 – FLAT TAX REFORM: LONG-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS 
UTILITY WITH VS. WITHOUT REFORM:  CONSUMPTION-EQUIVALENT VARIATION AS A PROPORTION OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT 
(LOW IES) 
  
FIGURE B.19 – FLAT TAX REFORM: LONG-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS 
UTILITY WITH VS. WITHOUT REFORM:  MULTIPLICATIVE WELFARE GAIN (LOW IES) 
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TABLE B.2 – FLAT TAX REFORM: BALANCED GROWTH PATH CHARACTERISTICS (HIGH IES) 
   
Characteristics of the Balanced Growth Path 
After the Flat Tax Reform ( high IES = 1 ) 
 
 
Comparison 
Before 
the 
reform 
 
Difference 
 
 
long-term growth rate 
 
 
  
 
0.02115 
 
 
0.0186 
 
+ 0.00255 
 
time in market work 
 
 
tt el 1  
 
0.219 
 
0.2111 
 
+ 0.0079 
 
time in education 
 
 
te  
 
0.100 
 
0.09583 
 
+ 0.004 
 
leisure time 
 
 
tl  
 
0.681 
 
0.69306 
 
- 0.012 
 
consumption / GDP 
 
t
t
y
c
 
 
0.562 
 
0.606 
 
- 0.044 
 
investment in physical capital 
t
kt
y
i
 
 
0.296 
 
0.2453 
 
+ 0.0507 
 
investment in human capital 
t
ht
y
i
 
 
0.032 
 
0.0384 
 
- 0.006 
 
physical capital stock 
t
t
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k
 
 
3.747 
 
3.1424 
 
+ 0.605 
 
human-to-physical capital ratio 
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14.980 
 
20.4 
 
- 5.42 
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FIGURE B.20 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE (HIGH IES) 
 
 
 
FIGURE B.21 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE 
(HIGH IES) 
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 FIGURE B.22 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – INDEX OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT (HIGH IES) 
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FIGURE B.23 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – TIME IN EDUCATION (HIGH IES) 
 
 
FIGURE B.24 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – TIME IN EDUCATION (HIGH IES) 
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FIGURE B.25 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – TIME IN MARKET WORK (HIGH IES) 
 
 
FIGURE B.26 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – TIME IN MARKET WORK  
(HIGH IES) 
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FIGURE B.27 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – LEISURE TIME (HIGH IES) 
 
 
 
FIGURE B.28 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – LEISURE TIME 
(HIGH IES)  
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FIGURE B.29 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – WAGE RATE (HIGH IES) 
 
 
FIGURE B.30 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – INTEREST  RATE (HIGH IES) 
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FIGURE B.31 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – UTILITY (HIGH IES)  
 
 
FIGURE B.32 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – UTILITY 
(HIGH IES) 
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FIGURE B.33 – FLAT TAX REFORM: TRANSITION DYNAMICS – UTILITY CHANGE (HIGH IES) 
 
FIGURE B.34 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS – UTILITY CHANGE 
(HIGH IES) 
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FIGURE B.35 – FLAT TAX REFORM: LONG-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS 
PATH OF UTILITY OVER TIME:  CONSUMPTION-EQUIVALENT VARIATION AS A PROPORTION OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT 
(HIGH IES) 
 
FIGURE B.36 – FLAT TAX REFORM: SHORT-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS 
PATH OF UTILITY OVER TIME:  CONSUMPTION-EQUIVALENT VARIATION AS A PROPORTION OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT 
(HIGH IES) 
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FIGURE B.37 – FLAT TAX REFORM: LONG-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS 
UTILITY WITH VS. WITHOUT REFORM:  CONSUMPTION-EQUIVALENT VARIATION AS A PROPORTION OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT 
(HIGH IES) 
  
FIGURE B.38 – FLAT TAX REFORM: LONG-RUN TRANSITION DYNAMICS 
UTILITY WITH VS. WITHOUT REFORM:  MULTIPLICATIVE WELFARE GAIN (HIGH IES) 
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